


Centro Interdipartimentale di Ricerca
sul Cambiamento Politico
*Centre for the Study
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**THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE IN ITALY. A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS
OF PARTY PREFERENCES (1950-2001)**

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N. 12/2003

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1. Party elites, political discourse and European Integration. Conceptual clarifications and research strategies*

The puzzle: understanding the transformations of party elite attitudes towards European integration

This chapter intends to provide a broad long-term analysis of the changing significance of the question of European integration (and of some related issues) in the discourse of the most important political parties in Italy, during the last fifty years. Pursuing this general goal will give us the opportunity to provide an original contribution to a growing debate on the pro/anti-European attitudes of political parties within the European Union (Hix and Lord 1997; Hooghe et al. 2002; Marks 1999; Ray 1999; Ladrech 2000; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2002) and, at the same time, it will help us to explore the cognitive problem raised by the broad research undertaking the present contribution ascribes to: to what extent has the political discourse on European integration followed/preceded the changes in the whole perception of the public opinion and/or other external pressures? In other words, the rationale of this chapter recalls an old question about the actual impact of political elites on the process of Community building (Slater 1982), which is very simple in its formulation, but particularly challenging in its practical exploration, when one has to pass from an impressionistic image of party elites' capability to shape the policy agenda and form the collective opinions, to a more precise account of the relationship among these elements.

In Italy, some simplified views tend to rapidly solve the question, pushing a specific argument and keeping the rest of the scene like a fixed, insignificant background. For instance, the idea that Italian political elites used to "import" the European perspective, as an answer to balance the low degree of democratic satisfaction affecting the Italian public opinion, is quite recurrent. Probably there is some truth in this argument, and it fits the unquestionable image of a prolonged destiny of *European loyalty* of Italian political elites (Cotta 1998). On the other hand, while historians have been traditionally concerned with the causes of some *peculiar* attitudes of the Italian parties (namely, the multifaceted Atlanticism/Europeanism of Christian Democracy, or the particular *Eurocommunism* of the Communist party), a rather insufficient effort has been done, especially in terms of empirical analysis, to explore the dynamic of change in the "European vocation" of Italian political elites. We know, for instance, that

* The paper is the fruit of a joint reflection. Nonetheless, N. Conti is particularly responsible for sections 2 and 3, while L. Verzichelli for sections 1 and 4. We thank Maurizio Cotta for his valuable comments on earlier versions of this work. We would also like to thank all the participants to the seminar held at CIRCaP, University of Siena, on 27 May 2002. We are also grateful to Daniele Pasquinucci for his advice on historical sources and interpretations.

during particular conjunctures political leaders have “used” the European issue as a tool to enforce their role and to legitimise party rule in Italy. But we do not know much more about the way European integration has worked for domestic party politics. Historical biographies are useful but not sufficient for this purpose¹, as well as insufficient appear to be, as we will see below, the purely quantitative analysis of the salience of Europe in the party discourse.

Nowadays, to understand the role of partisan elites in the politicisation of those issues connected to supranational governance is particularly interesting. In fact, the narratives of some specific crucial events of EU-building (Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Radaelli 2002) illustrate an active role of the Italian *non political* leadership, vis a vis a certain degree of submissiveness showed by the political leadership. The apparent contradiction between the strong (and stable, until the early nineties) Italian *party government*, and the *non partisan* origin of a strong commitment of the country to the cause of European integration, allows for a number of questions. In sum, our interest is to develop the question of the role actually played by political elites to shape Italian Europhilia. For this purpose, instead of applying a “one way” thesis on the relationship between elites and public opinion, where public opinion can be seen, in turn, as an endogenous or as an exogenous factor, we will look for a dynamic conception of a given opinion formation². In this way, we can keep the idea that the process of European integration might have largely been a construction of political elites (particularly, in a context of strong party government like the Italian political scene until 1992), but we can also imagine that, over the years, the same political elite might have been often pushed by a public eager to change the path of European integration.

The model we propose to interpret the main transformations of party elite’s attitudes towards European integration can be summarised as in figure 1: briefly, party elites’ *general views* on the integration process are formed by ideological and strategic factors, but they are also influenced (on specific aspects of European integration and at particular points in time) by the public opinion. The final product of this is a *formation discourse*, first directed to party activists, and then to the collective body, whose different components (eg. historical mission of European integration, role of Europe in the world, trade off between European advantages and national advantages) are covered (or neglected) in very different ways.

¹ These works mainly focus on actors who marked specific periods rather than on a long-term approach (studies on the Christian Democratic leader Alcide de Gasperi are a good example). Some important works have been also produced about “European politicians” and their limited impact on intra-party debates.

² We refer here to the model developed by Kuklinski and Segura (1995). Cfr. Ammendola and Isernia (in Cotta, Isernia and Verzichelli, forthcoming) for a broader discussion of the application of such model to the opinion formation on European integration.

Coherently with the above motivations, the aim of this chapter is twofold: 1) to provide a descriptive account of long-term transformations in the attitudes of the Italian political elites towards the issue of European integration, across parties and across time; 2) to explore the different party attitudes, and eventually to explain the degrees of variation in the light of party-specific, leadership-specific, or contextual factors. Empirically speaking, we aim here at reconstructing long term “pathways” marked by the different party positions on European Integration. In order to reach this goal, we will look at the sequence of historical phases between the Italian democratic re-consolidation of the late forties and the end of the XX century.

Before starting with the findings of the empirical research, we need now to clarify the conceptual and methodological tools we will use in this work: in the next four paragraphs of this introductory section, we will briefly discuss the connection between party elites and party discourse, the components of the European party discourse we have tried to measure by means of different indicators, the quantitative measures of the *explanandum* we have produced and the time span(s) we have selected for our longitudinal analysis.

Why should we focus on “party elite discourse” on European Integration ?

The first conceptual clarification concerns the notion of party elite and the use we want to make of this concept. What is crucial to us is to disentangle the role played by parties in the broader debate about Europe. In other words, we have here to detect the concrete political strategies and policy ideas crossing party discourse, and shaping party views on EEC/EU. This led us to analyse *how party elites use to filter and interpret the issue of European Integration*, in a way to simplify such a complex theme and circulate it among their own delegates, activists and voters.

The historical perspective adopted in this work does not allow us to systematically analyse the individual preferences of the party elites (simply because of the total absence of long term surveys on this topic). Our purpose is, finally, to map the predisposition of the most important parties to *talk about Europe*, and to code their prevailing preferences on some specific questions introduced by the integration process. The level of analysis, in other words, remains an aggregate one: the political discourse of the Italian political elite, controlled by party and over time.

What do they say about Europe? The different components of the European discourse

As we already said, we want to focus on the salience of the European issues on the whole party discourse. Because of that, we cannot refer only to the communication discourse at the

time of the “electoral supply” (i.e. the party manifestos), but we will try to report on a more comprehensive set of party documents in the attempt to analyse what can be labelled as the “formation discourse” (Schmidt 2001) produced by the party leadership throughout different situations: the debate around cabinet crises or inaugurations, national and European electoral campaigns, the intra-party debate, *ad hoc* conferences on Europe and, of course, the acts from official party congresses.

There is an obvious limit in this approach: the party discourse does not necessarily indicate the real ability of parties to activate and respond to the questions raised by European Integration. In other words, we cannot produce a fully comprehensive account of party elites reactions/pro-actions in relation to European integration during the analysed period. On the other hand, the longitudinal analysis of party discourse will be useful to define a wide set of problematic changes in the relationship between party elites and European integration, in a way to suggest adequate explanations for each of these changes. As a matter of fact, we will select specific indicators measuring the commitment of the Italian political elites towards the European issues: how important and deep has the internal debate about the EEC/EU membership been? To what extent have the party elites pressured the party bases? Or, on the contrary, have the party followers guided and convinced their leaders to take a given position?

From this point of view, the long term analyses developed so far do not seem sufficiently empirically grounded, although two basic arguments dominating the most quoted interpretations of the Italian international and foreign policy (i.e. Santoro 1993) are hardly questionable:

- 1) A clear divide between a fully pro-European government elite (from De Gasperi to La Malfa, from the Liberals to some Socialists) used to contrast a fully Eurosceptical opposition, including the nationalist heirs of the fascist ideology (the extreme right of Msi) and the leaders of the largest Communist party in the Western experience (the Pci). According to most observers, the anti-European attitude of the communist leadership was suddenly changed during the seventies, when an Euro-communist perspective of independence from Moscow developed (Webb 1979).
- 2) The Italian government elite used to keep a loyal but “reserved” judgement on European integration. That is to say, since the times of De Gasperi and Gaetano Martino, there was no clear involvement of the Italian political elites in the process of European integration. Italy was always a “middle rank power”, submitted both to the American guidelines and to the initiatives of the more powerful continental partners (France and Germany).

There is no reason to put these general points under discussion here. Moreover, they seem to be roughly confirmed by an elaboration we made (figure 2 and 3) using the ECPR party manifesto data³, which is the main comparative data source used by political scientists to measure the content of party programmes.

FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE

Figures 2 and 3 indicate how a wave of support to EEC starts in the electoral manifestos of governing parties during the fifties (the period of negotiations leading to EEC-building) with no significant traces of anti-integration sentences. Conversely, the profile of the left opposition party platforms (including the Socialist party until 1963) seems initially to react in a very sceptical way to the idea of integrating Europe: the number of sentences supporting a pro-European view is irrelevant, while some few hints of Euroscepticism (coming from the Pci records) are reported by ECPR data between 1958 and 1968. Party attitudes seem to change during the phase of *Eurocommunism* and *historic compromise* (1975-1979), when the Pci platform shows a clear (even if relatively weak) pick of pro-Europeanism.

If we consider the salience of the pro- or anti-European community stances on the total quasi-sentences coded within the domain including these two codes (external relations)⁴ the four curves become slightly smoother but they maintain the same shape. Thus, we can say that the starting point of our qualitative analysis about the attitudes to European integration of the Italian parties reflects the images we can draw from the “stories” told by previous researches. Nonetheless, the picture should be completed by other elements: the degree of commitment of the political elites to the idea of European Integration and the degree of innovation within the elite discourse are two dimensions which have been totally neglected by empirical analyses. Our proposal, therefore, is to take the road of the empirical test, in order to produce a more detailed description and to have a closer look to the transformations over time.

This goal cannot be pursued through the analysis of the ECPR party manifesto data, for several reasons: first, the number of sentences concerning European issues in the documents covered by that data set is too small. Secondly, the variables used there (presence of mentions pro or against the EEC) is too vague for this kind of goal. Third, there is an evident lack of information about the real state of the internal party debate and the circulation of ideas over time.

³ We thank Andrea Volkens who allowed us to use these data.

⁴ This domain includes 10 alternative categories: Foreign Special Relationships: positive; Foreign Special Relationships: negative; Anti-Imperialism; Military: positive; Military: negative; Peace; Internationalism: positive; European Community: positive; Internationalism: negative; European Community: negative.

Therefore, we decided to use a broader set of qualitative information coming from an in-depth analysis of a number of documentary sources concerning different party activities. The relevant information has been partially recoded in a quantitative data set, whose codebook is reported in the following table (table 1). The last variable listed in the codebook is a five point scale representing the overall position we attribute to each single document on the dimension *pro-Europeanism/Euroscepticism*: in this way, we want to raise a rough classification of the degree of commitment of the party discourse to European integration, following the categorization illustrated in the following table (table 2).

TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE

The negative attitude to European integration has been considered following a categorization already tested by recent analyses (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2002) and that we elaborated and partially rephrased here. The most extreme point in the negative scale (*Hard Euroscepticism*) is represented by a principled opposition to EU and European integration, which is supported by a clear proposal to stop or invert the process of integration. In other words, the political discourse is centred on the idea that a country should withdraw from membership, oppose the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived or, anyway, stop the largest part of the policy convergences in act.

The next category of Euroscepticism is that of *soft Euroscepticism*. In practical terms, this should not entail a principled objection to European integration or EU membership, but it may concern one (or a number) of policy areas. A party (or party faction or party leader) falling in this category would qualify as a clear opponent of the EEC/EU progress, arguing that 'national interests' would be at odds with the EU trajectory (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2002).

While the point 0 obviously refers to an absolute "non engagement", that is to say the absence of mentions on and/or commitments to European Integration, the positive points of the scale imply two distinguished dimensions: the first dimension is one of pragmatic acceptance of the status quo (*functional Europeanism*). Here, the support to European integration can be re-conducted to a mere "calculus", the one of pursuing a national interest or a specific party goal, rather than integration in itself. In this kind of approach, there is no commitment to further integration, unless it is proved it would serve such interests. Examples of such type of attitude can be found in some positive judgements about a given situation (i.e. the making of EMU since it would prove useful for the domestic economy), but with no real commitment to complete that in a comprehensive "integration design".

The highest level of pro-Europeanism is what we have called *Identity Europeanism*. Here, we mean the absolute predominance of a claim in favour of the shift of further competences from the national to the supranational arena, of a Federal Europe and of European citizenship. In

this perspective, a deeper integration is considered as a specific priority and a fundamental goal for the party throughout its political discourse.

Structuring the longitudinal analysis: the interaction between pro-European discourse, phases of European Integration and cycles of party government in Italy

The last clarification concerns the timing of our research: differently from the approaches focused on the measurement of “pro-Europeanism” (or anti-Europeanism) of individual parties (Ray 1999, Szczerbiak and Taggart 2000) or on the overall impact of Europe on the party systems (Mair 2000), we aim here to find eventual connections between the re-shaping of “domestic” party discourse and the changes at supranational level. Therefore, a time-intensive strategy of investigation like those proposed by the studies mentioned above would be inadequate.

This leads us to an additional problem, residing in the structural difference between two historical phases we face here: the period of the *first republic* (1948-1992) is in fact characterised by a very stable political elite, while the nineties have been crossed by a sudden and intense change of the party system, which determined a significant renewal of the political elite and, consequently, a potential transformation of the political discourse. We propose to solve this problem measuring first continuity and discontinuity in the political discourse within the two historical periods, and to leave to the final part of the chapter the discussion on whether the attitudes of party elites have really changed from the first historical cycle to the other.

However, the plain longitudinal comparison between the recent party discourse and the “old” one cannot be an exhaustive way of controlling the transformation of party elite attitudes in Italy, because it would not tackle another relevant question of the puzzle: the connection between the significance of the European issue and the evolution of *coalition governance* in Italy. First of all, is there a connection? And, in case of a positive answer, what is the story influencing the other? In order to shed a light on this problem, we can simultaneously show the series of coalition governance cycles (Verzichelli and Cotta 2000) and the main steps of European Integration (figure 4).

FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE

As one can see, the phases of change in domestic politics seem rather independent from the evolution of European integration. On the other hand, at least two historical turning points have to be mentioned here, since they seem to hold together change at the domestic and at the supranational level: at the end of the seventies, in the domestic arena the return to a “normal” majority-opposition dynamic after a time of grand coalition (*national*) goes together

with the debate on EMS; while at the beginning of the nineties, the end of the “first republic” coincides with the development of the crucial *vincolo esterno* (Dyson and Featherstone 1996) created by the negotiation of EMU.

Considering the need to control variations in sufficiently durable periods of time, we have decided to consider in our analysis three significant turning-points: the start of a new *centre-left* coalition including the Socialist party (1963); the start of a new five-party coalition after the national solidarity (1979), and the start of a completely new party system after the sudden breakdown occurred between the election of 1992 and those of 1994.

Content of the chapter

After refining our methodological and practical clarifications, we can now move to the empirical analysis: the first step will consist in producing a comprehensive account of the idea of European Integration developed within party discourse in Italy, during the years of the cold war. Three historical parties will be considered, representing a large sector of the political elites and the three main political options: the Christian Democracy (Dc), which used to be all along this period the largest party of the spectrum; the Communist party (Pci), traditionally the second party and the opposition leader; and finally the Socialist party (Psi), initially linked to the communist strategy and, then, progressively involved in different governmental cycles. After that, section 3 will concern the evolution of party preferences during the last decade of the XX century: a period celebrated as the end of party-cracy (Bufacchi and Burgess 2001), and dominated by a growing debate on the European issue.

Section 4 will develop a comprehensive assessment of the evolution of party elite discourse on European Integration, before and after 1992. At first, we will provide a quantitative analysis about the differences (party by party and over time) we have met coding the party documents. Then, we will focus on some data on motivational change of the Italian party elites before and after the historical watershed of the early nineties. The contrast between the content of party documents and the data about the personal commitments of single MPs will lead us to estimate in a more comprehensive way to what extent the most recent decades have marked clear-cut passages in the attitudes of Italian party elites toward Europe.

A short conclusive section will finally resume the main findings of our analysis, connecting them to the primary research questions we have raised in this introduction.

2. Party discourse on European Integration in Italy during the cold war era.

Political discourse and Europe: Implications from the longitudinal approach

It is time to have a closer look to the data we were able to collect and show which surplus of information is available from them. Our first remark concerns the extent to which the data fit the general images illustrated above. According to the ECPR party manifesto data, a rather clear trend in the salience of the pro-European /anti-European statements produced by the electoral platforms is visible. As a matter of fact, our documents show that the intensity of the pro-Europeanism shown by party documents does not increase over the years. If we take the simple distribution of the overall grades we have attributed to each single document produced during the cold war period, controlled by party and by the three sub-periods illustrated above, we realise that the structure of the discourse of the Dc is quite regular, oscillating from a significant absence of European commitment to permanent identity Europeanism (figure 5). The only party that seems to radically change its position is the Pci, but this just confirms the hypothesis of the late “strategic” re-shape of the party view of Europe, in the attempt to find some good alternative to the “Atlanticist/anti-Atlanticist” dilemma. On the other hand, a significant number of “no mention” codes systematically appears, above all concentrated in documents of the intra-party debate and party congress final statements. In other words, the general level of European commitment in the “formation discourse” is far from being as striking as some “communicative” texts like the electoral platforms might suggest. Overall, this assertion is quite perfectly applicable to the Dc, to the Psi during the sixties and even to the Communist party during the seventies.

FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE

Another question to be explored is the supposedly increasing salience of European integration with the passing of time: one can think that the necessity to “construct” a European discourse, to be used by the party elite in order to enforce its appeal while communicating with the voters, should increase over the time, thus modifying the political discourse. For example, many analyses have pointed out the “new space” for a public discourse on European Integration at the beginning of the eighties. A normative vision circulating at that time saw this opportunity as a positive “salvation” from the evident problems faced by the national political elites, especially in Italy (Papisca 1977). More analytically, Maurizio Cotta tried to point out the pre-requirements to see a core *European political elite* in action (1980; 1981): very briefly, these requirements can be summarised as follows: 1) the achievement of some degree of stability, over time, of a core of politicians completely involved in European affairs, instead of the traditional “circulation” from national to

European arenas and vice-versa, 2) the achievement of some degree of distinctiveness and autonomy vis a vis their national counterparts.

In the reality, the party discourse after the first direct election of the EP does not show any significant change: confirming the impression of the scarce degree of institutionalisation of the European politicians (Verzichelli 1991) our analysis of party documents does not show a particular quantitative increase of mentions about European Integration, neither a qualitative evolution of such approach. In fact, as we will see more in detail later, a more recurrent use of the “European rhetoric” sometimes has to be connected more with political strategies of domestic politics, than with an interest for Europe *per se*.

In order to complete this picture, we will present in the following pages some of the “stories” of the most relevant parties in the period 1948-1992. In this way, we want to shed a light on some changes we could identify in the political discourse during the whole “cold war” period. This will lead us to build a more precise map of party elite orientations on European integration and to prepare the analysis of the new framework opened by the party system change of the nineties.

Since our goal here is to provide a systematic assessment of the discourse related to European integration offered by party elites to their followers, we will concentrate on the way parties treat three substantive aspects: 1) historical vision of European Integration process; 2) the role of an integrated Europe in the international order; 3) the preferences on the European institution-building; 4) the estimate of the impact of the process of European integration on domestic interests. In order to pursue this aim, we will analyse the significance of these themes within the party discourse, from the foundation of EEC to the end of the eighties. The same exercise – this time focused on the nineties - will be repeated in the following section.

Dc: the Europeanism of a regime-party

As already said, the Dc attitudes towards European integration have always been very supportive. From the times of De Gasperi to the last Andreotti government (1991-92), the official party speakers strongly supported all key decisions in the integration process. Open debate within the party on the approach to European integration was usually scarce with a few exceptions, pro-Europeanism being rooted in the party ideology and identity. In fact, it seems that since the very beginning of the period starting from the end of WWII, the party had an approach to the European issue that meets the definition we gave to the category of Identity Europeanism. In spite of this, some evolution in specific aspects of the party vision of Europe can be found over the time, as well as some intra-party tensions. This does not affect

the overall picture of a party characterised by long-established pro-Europeanism. On the contrary, the Dc is the party showing the highest level of Euro-enthusiasm, with identity Europeanism largely prevailing in the analysed documents (table 3). Nevertheless, a lack of salience of the European issue in the political discourse of the Dc is often visible in the documents. Moreover, shifts in the preferences on some specific aspects can be registered. In this paragraph we will try to describe the dynamics of the Christian Democrats' commitment to European integration.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

During the forties, already before the end of the war, the party asked for European cooperation and growing integration. References to a more-integrated Europe are not systematic in party documents, but there are already some relevant references defining a clear vision of Europe⁵. In fact, at that time European integration was seen by the party as an instrument to promote peace and international cooperation, against the predominance of the Superpowers. A more integrated Europe had to play an autonomous role in the world order, promote harmony and development in the continent, and at the same time to promote peace in the international arena. In some party documents, negative mentions were explicitly made on Superpower predominance and European integration was described as a solution to avoid the risk of marginality of Western European states. In this vision, not only Europe was seen as promoting economic expansion and peaceful relations among states still, or recently, in war but also as a political entity competing with the Superpowers and playing an *autonomous* role of peace promotion. This attitude clearly shows that the party's pro-Europeanism did not start as a component of a broader strategy of foreign policy, having Atlanticism and loyalty to the U.S as its main pillar (Formigoni 1996). On the contrary, in the original party position some potential for competition with U.S. can be found. This also explains why the shaping of the party preferences on the geo-political position of Italy and on European integration was a process that sometimes proved problematic.

During the fifties we can find one of the main examples of intra-party tension related to foreign policy and to preferences on European integration. In fact, in this decade the party developed a vision that was mainly focused on the gains coming to Italy from economic integration. With the Cold War showing its magnitude, very little was left to any hope to develop a Western European entity able to compete with the two Super-powers, to play an autonomous role and to re-balance the international distribution of power. European integration started to be mainly seen as a source of domestic modernization and economic

⁵ Reference to European integration have been found in the following party platforms: *L'ordine internazionale* (May 1943), *1944: Pensando al dopo "La politica del buon senso"* (December 1944).

expansion. On the other hand, as far as the international role of an integrated Europe is concerned, this was the decade where the party developed its preference for loyalty to U.S. and associated the unification of Western Europe to the Atlantic community. This process of party preference shaping was not unchallenged. In fact, at that time, the ratification of the *CED* in Italy would prove quite problematic if ever it took place, not only because of the opposition of the Italian Socialdemocrats, but also because of divisions within the Dc. The Scelba government was finally released from the tensions the ratification would have certainly produced thanks to the failure of the project of a common defence policy due to the French opposition. But divisions on the geo-political position of Italy were rooted in the party and evidence of this developed shortly later⁶.

During the fifties the left-wing faction of the Dc was highly critical towards the preference for loyalty to U.S. expressed by the party leadership. Members of this faction opposed such strategy with an alternative one: cooperation in the international arena with both Superpowers and cooperation in the domestic arena with left-wing parties. When in 1954, after the failure of *CED*, a military alliance named *WEU* was created among a number of Western European countries including Italy, the main representatives of the left-wing faction developed open opposition to it and tried to change the party strategy in this area. Some of them voted against the ratification of *WEU* in parliament⁷, while some others produced an alternative propaganda, very critical to the government decisions⁸. The party elite adopted a strict strategy on the problem of intra-party division in this field and decided to expel these members from the party. Some of them turned to the area close to the Communist party, while some others were less active for a period and came back to activism some years later, promoting political cooperation with the Socialist party in the domestic arena (Malgeri 1987)⁹. This event weakened the left-wing faction and expelled its more radical representatives from the party. Together with them, intra-party opposition to the process of European integration was largely eradicated.

The content analysis of party documents dating back to the mid-fifties reveals that the Dc's political discourse did not clearly develop the issue of the geo-political position of Europe,

⁶ On the pre-1957 debate, see the following documents: *Programma governativo concordato fra la DC, il PSI, il PLI e il PRI* (5 February 1954), *Tre ordini del giorno della Direzione Centrale della DC* (16 June 1954), *Due ordini del giorno del V Congresso Nazionale della DC* (26-30 June 1954), *Atti Direzione Centrale* (15 October 1955), *Mozione del VI Congresso Nazionale della DC* (14-18 October 1956).

⁷ The two MPs who voted against the final ratification of *WEU* were Melloni and Bartesaghi.

⁸ This alternative propaganda was very active and gained visibility thanks to the press linked to the centre-left action. Among the most eminent journals promoting the alternative strategy was *Prospettive*.

sometimes proving rather silent on the problem of the role of a more integrated Europe in the international order (table 3). Although most of the documents have been considered on the whole as oriented to Identity Europeanism, the process of European integration was often represented as a domestic convenience, proving beneficial for the modernization of the country, and for this reason further integration was claimed. The impact of intra-party tensions on the political discourse of the Dc made the question of the international role of Europe somehow problematic, and for this reason EEC was often represented simply as a matter of defence of domestic interests. By the end of the decade the party was silent on this problem and the level of commitment of its political discourse to European integration was rather low in all its aspects. Some hints of this general “defensive” discourses follow:

If Euratom is an advantage for Europe, it is even more so for Italy, a country poor in natural resources. The Dc, aware of the benefits that Euratom can bring to Italy, not only gave its unconditional support to the treaty, but led as well an action whose aim was to build the largest majority possible supporting the treaty...
...the Western world, thanks to the Atlantic treaty, the WEU and to the first steps towards a European Union, shows the need of an ever deeper integration among similar nations, in order to defend their own existence and future¹⁰.

In the sixties, party attitudes towards European integration were more cohesive, even if no unanimity can still be found, at least until the middle of the decade. More and more European integration was seen in terms of domestic gains, there was not much reference to the potential mission of the European entity in the world order. European integration was still represented as serving goals of modernization, economic expansion and, in the Italian case, of country-legitimation in the international arena, where Italy would otherwise be a marginal actor given its status of middle-range power and loser in the WWII. The Dc supported any measure oriented to more economic and political integration. First of all, the Common Market was acknowledged as a mechanism for domestic modernization and for the solution of endemic domestic problems. In the sixties, the party already showed a vision of European integration as a solution to inadequacies of the domestic system, and economic and political constraints coming from Europe were expected to overcome the endogenous weakness of Italy coming from a highly polarised and fragmented political system, institutional inefficiency and domestic interests hostile to reforms. Moreover, the party felt that a united democratic Europe would contain the domestic communist threat.

⁹ Some of the DC members writing in *Prospettive* founded later *Stato Democratico*, a review that played an important role in promoting the political alliance with the Socialist party.

¹⁰ Excerpt from *Cento Argomenti. Orientiamo gli elettori*, programmatic platform of the Dc (1958).

Another step in the process of party preference shaping on European integration, already clear in the mid-fifties, concerns the juxtaposition of pro-Europeanism and Atlanticism. As we mentioned before, this process produced some relevant costs for the party, mainly in terms of intra-party struggles. In the mid-sixties, when the socialist party joined the government majority (after accepting the Italian participation to Nato), the anti-Atlanticist minority within the Dc was very small and the support to European integration definitively integrated in a broader strategy of foreign policy having loyalty to U.S. and to the Atlantic Community as its main pillars. This combination of Atlanticism and pro-Europeanism is a peculiar feature in the attitudes of the Dc. This is very different from what happened in other countries where the two communities were not necessarily seen as equal, and where in some cases they were even considered as alternative ones, and either European integration was seen as a response to the American influence played through NATO (as in France under De Gaulle) or the Atlantic Community was seen as a more advantageous, yet different choice than European integration (as in Britain). Here is a clear-cut excerpt from the 1963 Dc electoral manifesto, showing the delicate equilibrium merging Atlanticism and Pro-Europeanism:

We are in favour of a united Europe, democratic and firmly inserted in the Western alliance, open to the rest of the world...We will not step back in front of the difficulties that the process of European unification experiences today, but at the same time we will not oppose one particularism to another particularism...

During the sixties, there are still traces of divisions within the party. As a matter of fact, during the party congresses the left-wing faction produced alternative proposals and made reference to a united Europe as an entity promoting peace in the world order and challenging the Superpower predominance. Nevertheless, by the end of the sixties, even where documents of the left-wing faction claimed a role of peace-promotion and re-balancing of the international distribution of power for an integrated Europe, loyalty to the Atlantic Community was explicitly mentioned.

The data show that, during this decade, Christian democracy had quite fixed preferences on the different aspects of European integration we analyse (specifically, support to a strong Europe/Nato alignment and to a growing institutional enforcement within the EEC) and that a euro-enthusiastic attitude in the party political discourse prevailed. On the other hand, some documents reveal a total indifference to the European issues, showing that the party long-established Europhilia not always was characterised by pro-active stances. Remarkably, two party congresses in this decade (in 1962 and 1969) completely neglected the institutional themes of European integration, focusing only upon the juxtaposition of Europe and

Atlanticism. Finally, no salience of the European issue has been found in different cabinet inauguration speeches¹¹.

The seventies are characterised by a certain level of discontinuity in the tones, as well as in the positions of the party. However divisions and discontinuity on the European issue should not be exaggerated, some tensions can be registered, as well as shifts in some specific party preferences. At that time, the domestic system was challenged by an international economic crisis culminating with the *oil shock*. The international situation, combined with the systemic inefficiency of the country, found the system unable to respond to the economic emergency adequately. In the domestic arena a new political environment was growing, with the Communist party shifting to more moderate and West-loyal positions and with a growing electoral support for the left. The Dc attempted to find a solution to the deep political and economic crisis of this decade with a political alliance with the Communists, who then supported the Dc government. This experience lasted only few years, but the related debate characterised the whole decade and had an influence on the party attitudes towards European integration.

In fact, the convergence with the Communists together with the need for political solutions to a deep economic and political crisis provoked a radicalisation of the intra-party debate on the geo-political position of the country. Differently from the past, when the criticisms to European integration had been typically raised by the left "trade unionist" factions of the party, it was now the "Atlanticist" position of the centre-right, calling for loyalty to the United States above all, to voice some criticism to the party pro-Europeanism¹². The tension was so deep that in his programmatic document presented at the party congress of 1973, the party secretary general, Arnaldo Forlani, used dramatic tones in depicting a situation where Italy would eventually be out of the Common Market and he deeply criticised party supporters of the idea of a country free from the European constraints.

Nevertheless, as long as the Italian Communists evolved into pro-West positions, the ideological debate on Atlanticism vs. pro-Europeanism lost its centrality and the Dc confirmed its stance in favour of European integration. Europe gained new centrality for the Communists who focused on this geo-political space to find alternative strategies to Soviet communism, in particular through a Western way to socialism (*Eurocomunismo*). The

¹¹ It is the case of the 1964 cabinet led by Aldo Moro. However, we need to underline that support to European integration and to its insertion into Atlanticism was already expressed in the 1963 cabinet inauguration and shared by all coalitional partners, including the Socialists, recently entered in the government.

¹² In fact, the few doubts about the permanence within the "monetary snake" were raised in the first half of the seventies by Christian Democratic leaders from the right-wing factions (the so called *Dorotei*, the followers of Fanfani and some politicians close to Giulio Andreotti).

existence of European integration was not denied anymore even by the party that most strongly opposed to it in the past. Windows of opportunities seemed to be open by the European political space even to parties with a past characterised by radicalism. In such a situation, within the Dc no more room was left to any strategy meeting Atlanticism and rejecting pro-Europeanism and the debate lost its significance throughout the decade.

As a result, by the mid-seventies very limited emphasis can be found in the party documents on the relationship between Atlanticism and pro-Europeanism. Of course, loyalty to the Atlantic community was not questioned. But some of the references to an integrated Europe in the party documents claimed an autonomous role for this entity, that a more integrated Europe should re-balance power in the world order and promote peace in the international arena. It seems that the party discourse shifted into more left-oriented positions in the area of geo-politics, coming closer to the ones of the Pci, maybe in the attempt to compete with the Communists who at the same time were gaining growing electoral support. In a document of 1975, which sounds like a theoretical basis for the *historical compromise* with the Pci, and that was largely inspired by the words of the Prime minister (and first initiator of this compromise) Aldo Moro, the European issue is confined to the two final pages (out of 122!), in a short chapter generally devoted to foreign policy and titled *an active policy without subordinations*. Here, one can find a general confirmation of the Europe/Nato alignment (but together with a broad opening to peace initiatives and perspectives of cooperation with the communist countries) and no concrete stances about European enforcement and/or the benefits coming from future integration. A short passage from this text follows:

Italy belongs to two Western alliances: Nato and the one reflected in the cooperation at the European level...The choice for Europe, the Atlantic treaty and the process of *detente* represent, from a long time, the main sources of our action, and they will continue to be in the future the main pillars of the Italian foreign policy...In particular, Italy believes that cooperation with the United States can be realized without mortifying Europe and, in fact, the country wants to accomplish the process leading to European unity starting twenty-five years ago.

The party commitment to European integration did not produce any new relevant element during the 1980s. The party developed greater expectations from the integration process as an instrument in order to overcome long-lasting domestic problems and the positive function of the *vincolo esterno* was often mentioned with great emphasis. The party was a strong supporter of the SEA and called for a full opening of markets, as well as for the creation of an economic and monetary union with a single currency. It also called for a greater European action in the social sphere and in cohesion policy and for a common foreign and security policy. Moreover, the Dc was in favour of the abolition of the veto power within the Council and it was deeply critical towards the intergovernmental method characterizing the

construction of the EU. The party aimed at the construction of a political union, ruled by supranational institutions able to bring the country to the most advanced European standards of efficiency and economic development. It is evident that European integration was seen as a solution to domestic stagnation, and for this reason deeper integration was presented as equal to domestic convenience.

The combination of Atlanticism and pro-Europeanism figured as an unchallenged choice and by the eighties the party reached on this position the largest consensus ever. Explicit reference to this position can be found in the party documents until the end of the eighties. In this decade the Dc also reached its highest level of commitment to the idea of a common European identity. In the party documents, strong and recurrent references were made on this issue, and in particular on the need to re-found national identity by merging it with a European one, and on the creation of a European citizenship. An extract from the 1983 Dc electoral manifesto states:

..the Dc was loyal to its choice for the West, seen not only as military but also as political solidarity and within this choice the party developed its free-market policy and a policy of international integration, during the years of the reconstruction as well as today, particularly aimed at building a united Europe.

In spite of the indubitable high level of commitment to European integration, the party not always produced documents covering specific aspects like the institutional EC enforcement. This phenomenon can be explained only by looking at the peculiar nature of Dc's politics: many observers agree that activism in the European field depended less on the party than on the initiative of various individuals such as prime ministers or ministers of Foreign Affairs. This resulted in a "policentric presence" of the Dc in matters of foreign policy in general, and of European affairs in particular (Pilati 1982), revealing lack of strategy and discontinuity in the party European activism. Finally, this led to a low-profile and underdeveloped party foreign policy (Bull 1994), secondary to the party concern for domestic problems. The Dc's European policy was essentially reactive and not proactive and, as Bull argued (1994), it was characterised more by "flawed" than by "genuine" Europeanism. This image matches the evidence we produced on the party preferences on European integration, always supportive but at several points lacking pro-active programmatic commitment, even more in a period of increase in the speed of supranational integration, as from the middle of the eighties where, on the contrary, the party political discourse often proved silent. This allows us to argue that, differently from the "Atlanticist" but proactive pro-Europeanism of the De Gasperi's age, the political discourse of the last generation of Christian democratic leaders was less proactive

and very committed to identify the party with the paternity of the diffuse “Europhilia” pervading a large sector of the Italian public opinion.

Pci: from fierce defence of national sovereignty to support to supranational integration

As already said, the Pci was the Italian party proving the longest-lasting opposition to European integration. From its very beginning, the integration process was seen by the party as one face of Atlanticism, driven by the United States and addressed to establish American hegemony in Western Europe. According to the Italian Communists, the strategy of integrating Europe was designed by American capitalism and supported by European capitalists, who were ready to sacrifice the national interests in order to defend their political and economic priorities. According to this reasoning, European integration was seen as a threat to all workers’ rights conquered in a long time in the domestic arenas.

In the Communist ideology, the persistence of a strong and unconstrained nation state was essential for the improvement of workers’ conditions, and any threat to it would entail a challenge to workers’ aspirations, since they would be pushed to shift the focus of their political action from class condition improvement and struggle for power, to defence of national sovereignty against foreign imperialism. Hence, the Pci’s international orientation did not share much with European supranationalism (Galante 1988; 1989). In the communist ideology, the assumption that the working class had the same orientations and served the same interests in every country was at the core of internationalism. According to this view, the Soviet state was the most sophisticated instrument in the hands of the working class and this justified its leading role in the world socialist movement. Of course, this ideological approach was not compatible with any attempt to build a supranational rule in a Western political space.

From the analysis of the party documents, the attitudes of the Italian Communists towards European integration seem very negative until the end of the sixties. All references to the Common Market present the negative impact of European integration on the Italian economy, on workers’ conditions and on democracy. We can have an idea of such an ideological approach from an excerpt from Pci’s 1958 electoral platform:

... cooperation with millions of workers and citizens has been broken. Today, the persistence of this rule means: installation of American missiles in the Italian territory, growing humiliating surrender to imperialism, economic crisis and disastrous consequences of the Common Market...

Particularly, the Common Market was accused to produce domestic unemployment, crisis of the agricultural sector, high costs in the import/export balance and to be one of the main

sources of the Italian economic crisis. Following the ideological argument of European integration serving American interests, the Common Market was finally presented by the Pci as an American political-military platform to control Western Europe. Nevertheless, in spite of the strong opposition to European integration, it is interesting to see that if until the end of the fifties the party asked the dissolution of the Common Market, by the beginning of the sixties there was a change of strategy. Evaluation of the Common Market was still very negative and there was a perfect continuity on this judgement during the twenty years after WWII. But the party did not call for the dissolution of the Common Market any longer, instead it claimed its transformation in a new entity, able to develop cooperation with Eastern Europe, as well as with other world areas. We can summarise such a strategic change with the following passage from the 1963 electoral platform:

The Common Market, the communists have always been against to because of its political goals linked to the Cold War and of the support it gives to the main interest groups, has become a cage within which Italy is constrained, ruled by the most reactionary international groups. For this reason, the Pci asks...that the barriers introduced by the Common market are overcome and starting by the revision of the Treaty of Rome, a greater cooperation is developed at the European as well as at the global level, open to the socialist and to the neutral countries.

Even if from the sixties, the party started to develop a more pragmatic orientation towards European integration and shifted from claims to stop the process and annul its outcomes to demands for deep reform, the attitudes of the Communists were still very negative, when they did not simply ignore the issue. Specific proposals for a reform of the Common Market were still quite rare in party documents, since for the party European integration was not an easy issue to invest on. The rejection of the process of European integration was imposed by the Soviet Union to all Western Communist parties. As a consequence, the evolution from the traditional party internationalism was a process that developed during a long time and that produced several intermediate outcomes before shifting into pro-European positions.

From our analysis of the party documents it seems that the beginning of the seventies can be taken as a watershed: the party ceased to present the EEC as a by-product of US imperialism, some kind of integration started to be supported, thus shifting the overall attitude to European integration from Hard to Soft Euroscepticism (table 4). The historical impact of the external and "communicative" discourse on European integration developed by the Pci in the years of the "Eurocommunist shift" is well known (Webb 1979; Maggiorani 1998). It is more difficult to say to what extent such a shift was due to a sincere "conversion" of the core elite or, otherwise, it came after a difficult phase of reshaping the party strategy. What we know, in this respect, is that the responsibility to justify the new position was delegated to a

very respected but somehow “peripheral” leader like Giorgio Amendola¹³, and the task was reached at the end of an arduous internal debate (Walker 1976, Pasquinucci 2000).

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

The several shocks provoked by the outcomes of Soviet imperialism pushed the party to a real metamorphosis, moving from its long-established internationalism, acknowledging to the Soviet Union the mission to lead the way to Socialism, to critical positions towards USSR and search for alternative strategies. The first outcome of such a change was not support for European integration, or a preference for the West European space. On the contrary, the party focused on the peculiarity of the Italian political situation¹⁴, confirming and even deepening its opposition to any sort of non-domestic constraint (Galante 1989), now also including the Soviet one. The party developed a new perspective based on multi-polarity in the international order, aiming at the end of Superpower bipolarity. At the same time, multi-polarity should apply to intra-communist relations, with the end of PCUS hegemony. Therefore, it can be said that until the end of the sixties the party ideology was still focused on two pillars: the nation and the world. The fact that at the end of the sixties for the first time a small group of Italian Communists joined the EP did not produce a rapid impact on the attitudes of the Pci. Socialization with European institutions and with specific EEC problems was a gradual process that did not push the party to abandon its perspectives in the short run.

Yet, the focus on the national dimension that followed the crisis of the traditional internationalism of the party proved very problematic after the events taking place in Chile. In fact, the party perceived two events as proof for the inappropriateness of the *national way* to socialism: Prague was the example from the East, while Santiago was the one from the West. With both internationalism and the national way to socialism over, the party shifted into new positions on European integration. Western Europe started to be seen as the political space where the party could develop fruitful relations with left-wing parties and work to drive itself to a less isolated position. As a consequence, the process of European integration started to be given an unprecedented attention in the party documents.

Moreover, acceptance of European integration and a general Atlantic loyalty were considered necessary steps to achieve the party strategy in the domestic arena - the “historical compromise” with Christian democrats. As it was one decade before with the Psi,

¹³ In fact, the “famous” speech of Enrico Berlinguer at the XIII party congress (March 1972) was mainly centred on the themes of domestic politics, while it was Giorgio Amendola, the same day, to face for the first time in the story of the Pci the question of a sincere acceptance of the EEC.

¹⁴ Where the Pci was the largest Western Communist party.

acceptance of the very idea of the integration of Western Europe played a legitimising role for the party to become a potential government partner.

Starting from the seventies, the party preference for the role of Western Europe in the world order fluctuated between an idea of Europe as an independent entity, equally distant from USA and USSR, to an idea of peace promotion with the specific mission of facilitating peaceful relationships between the two Superpowers. At the beginning of the seventies, the party was still very critical towards the role of the United States as a driving force of European integration and claimed autonomy from the American influence as a necessary step. But by the mid-seventies, the strong relationship linking Western Europe to the United States started to be rather accepted, leading the party to talk about ...*historical ties linking Italians to Americans*¹⁵.

Consequently, the criticism on the outcomes of European integration came to be much more articulate than in the past. According to the Pci, one of the main problems of EEC was its non-democratic nature. This became a recurrent feature in party documents throughout the seventies and, according to the Pci, solutions to this problem should include the direct election and the strengthening of the powers of the EP (at the expenses of the Commission and of the Council), a larger control of domestic parliaments on European politics and a larger involvement of the working class in the decision-making processes.

A crystal-clear evidence of the necessity to keep two different discourses together, i.e. an articulate and deep criticism on the trajectory of EEC and the support to a potential new Europe, politically autonomous and built on basis of social cooperation, can be found when carefully reading the several articles on European integration published by the party-magazine *Rinascita*, between the late sixties and 1979. Here, an increasingly relevant sector of the communist elite could address the new themes of the *Eurocommunist doctrine* (namely the necessity to democratise the EC and the importance of policy harmonisation), without receding from the most typical Pci's criticisms to the EEC (its capitalist nature and the negative impact of EMS and PAC). In this way, a precise *communication discourse* (specially oriented to activists and voters) traced the roots of a new pattern of attitudes towards European integration, without producing a disruptive or divisive *internal discourse* within the leading party elite.

In sum, European policies were still found to have a negative impact on a number of domestic interests. Among the negative effects that were mentioned, a great emphasis was placed on the strengthening of capitalism with related phenomena such as monopoly growth,

¹⁵ From the Pci platform of 1976.

wealth concentration, economic disequilibria. Moreover, European integration was found to produce the crisis of the domestic agricultural sector, peasants' migrations and price increase. Among the main Italian parties, the Pci showed the highest level of attention towards the theme of the defence of domestic interests, with the party systematically mentioning until the mid-seventies the overall negative impact of EEC on such interests, and only later proving silent (yet not positive) on this problem. Still at the end of the seventies this was one strong point of the Communist criticism to European integration, to the extent that one specific party proposal was to adopt a domestic strategy of rejection of any European decision conflicting with domestic interests. However, in spite of its criticisms, the party acknowledged the European arena as a valuable environment for promoting some of its programmatic priorities, such as the development of *Mezzogiorno* and of social policies. And for this reason the Pci also claimed a better representation of the country in the European institutions.

The attitudes of the Pci towards European integration did not change much during the eighties: a continuity with the "established idea of Europe" characterized its positions during this decade. Western Europe was considered the natural environment where the party could fruitfully develop relationships with other left-wing forces, and for this reason the party was strongly committed to support enlargement to Spain, Portugal and Greece, countries where the left was strong. The way to "European socialism" was not conceived as a national way any longer, but rather as an international process having in Europe its natural environment. The role of Europe in the world order was still conceived in terms of promotion of peace and cooperation, but during the eighties the emphasis mainly shifted to the issue of cooperation with developing countries. The party still promoted an alternative way to integration, mainly focused on the international mission of a more integrated Europe, on internal democratisation and on social policies. The party was also much less critical in relation to the outcomes of European integration and stated that the success of peace, disarmament and international economic cooperation would be linked to EC-building and to its ability to become a real political Union.

The Pci was the Italian party with the longest-lasting opposition to European integration. The analysis of party documents shows that opposition was voiced through explicit critical positions. Shifts in the party preferences were often preceded by a period of silence on the relevant aspects. Once the party shifted to pro-European positions, the documents started to be even more articulate and they developed an alternative model of integration. If in the case of the Dc our analysis could shed a light on some intra-party tensions in relation to European integration, here we should stress the evidence of an opposite model of party preference

shaping, that is to say a realignment through a “soft” way of the elites to present the strategic evolution of this monolithic force. Discontinuities are diluted over time and the opposition is not voiced in the party documents. The last document of the party we have coded in this series, the famous opening speech given by Achille Occhetto in the 1991 Congress (marking the passage from the Communist party to the Pds), still presents a slightly different conception of Europe: the speech is clearly centred on the idea of a modern and “European” left party, stressing the support to a strong European institutional enforcement, and to a clear autonomy of the European entity in the international scenario. On the other hand, the speech underlines the importance of the “tradition of autonomy” of the Italian left and, to some extent, it entails an alternative view of European integration. In this regard, we can hypothesize that, during such a sensitive moment in the party history, a difference still emerged between the “internal” discourse, mainly devoted to defend the traditional “different vision” of Europe, and the “electoral appeal”, centred on the necessity to confirm the pro-European change of the party, and to capture the Europhilia of the Italian public opinion.

Psi: a modern left European party constrained by the Italian reality

The destiny of the Italian Socialist party, the third party selected for our analysis, has been traditionally subordinated to the difficult relationship with the two *giants* of the party system of the *first republic* (Merkel 1986). In fact, all the positions expressed by this force on the issue of European Integration have been to some extent influenced by its peculiar character as “third actor” of the political spectrum.

After the war, the subordination of the socialist leaders to the Communist party prevented the promotion of the federalist ideas, which had characterised some sectors of its leadership during the years of the anti-fascist resistance. The official documentation reveals a sort of “silence” on the European issue in the internal debate, at least until the mid-fifties. The electoral manifestos for the 1948 and 1953 elections did not present any reference to the perspective of the integration of Europe. Even the opening speech to an important party congress (1957), marking the start of a pathway of “autonomy” from the Communist party, as well as the following electoral platform, neglected to debate on the future of European Integration. Nevertheless, it is well known that, differently from the Pci apparatus, the socialist leadership always participated to the European debate on the creation of a “European State”, and its opposition to the “liberal view” of the European Integration was never principled. Already during the second half of the fifties, the party could delineate its fully autonomous position on European Integration, voting in favour of Euratom and

abstaining on the parliamentary ratification of the ECSC¹⁶. Particularly important, in this pro-European shift, was the pressure of a group of intellectuals close to the old *Action party* and inspired by federalist ideas, who also accelerated the process of emancipation from the *Popular front* (the alliance between Communists and Socialists)¹⁷. The enforcement of European institutions and the claim in favour of cooperation with the other European countries was, in the view of these politicians, a natural step in the building of a political goal which they used to define as *Third way*.

When the time was mature to open for the participation of PSI in the “government area”, one of the most important issues to re-discuss within the party was the official position on the EEC. In fact, some of the most eminent, yet isolated, pro-European figures of the left were recruited and supported by the party (for example, Antonio Giolitti).

Nonetheless, the party kept its reluctance towards the traditional “market-oriented” idea of EEC, and there was no real active participation of the socialist elite in the debate on the important steps towards a more integrated Europe taken during the centre-left phase, not even during the first phase focused on the opportunity to build a Monetary union. According to historians (Kogan 1977; Cacace 1986), the European policy (as well as most of the whole package of the international policy) was delegated to the Dc, following the fundamental “agreement” that the centre-left government should not entail any change to the international commitments of Italy.

The situation did not change much during the years of the national solidarity, when the Socialist party was living a delicate phase of internal division, the Dc found in the Pci a more influential, though problematic ally than the Psi, and the Socialists experienced a very serious crisis of consensus. We need to go as far as the beginning of the eighties, when the party was lead by Bettino Craxi and by a new core of leaders in their forties, in order to find a real turning point. But, at the same time, we need not to forget that since the seventies, we can find a strong commitment of the Socialists to deeper integration, which was voiced by a claim for supranational institutional enforcement. It was the time of the “European Monetary System”, when the leadership of the Psi finally played an important role in the debate among the political elites. The overall attitude of the party during the seventies can be estimated as a form of Identity Europeanism even if, overall, the party still proved silent on many important

¹⁶ More exactly, the Psi moved from total opposition of an earlier stage, to abstention. Some socialist MPs, anyway, voted against the treaty.

¹⁷ One can mention the speech by Vittorio Foa (one of the leaders of the CGIL, the largest Italian Trade Union) at the Central Committee of July 1957: a strong and enthusiastic discourse supporting the pro-European shift of the Psi.

aspects (table 5), and revealed its nature of a minority party, more ready to react to the moves of the other actors of government, than to develop its own agenda.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

In general, this re-shaping of the party discourse came together with support for some specific issues of integration (support for the Monetary system, celebration of the EP direct election, creation of a single market) on which a large consensus among the government parties took place. After that, the experience of the Psi under Craxi was marked by another peculiar element: the attempt to move the focus of the political debate from the “Italian scenario” to the European one. This attempt was oriented to reach a double goal: 1) to show the legitimacy of the Socialist party to play a role, vis a vis the “exceptional” power of the largest communist party of Western Europe; 2) to assess the closeness between a European model of “efficiency” and a potential new system of government, centred on a greater role of the Italian Socialists.

Under this point of view, we can affirm that during the eighties the pro-Europeanism of the Psi was, first of all, an attempt to strengthen a specific message (and a social leadership) at the domestic level (Merkel 1986). At least two moments of such process can be found looking at the party documentation: the first one is the 1982 programmatic conference in Rimini, where a specific panel was devoted to the role that a modern “European party” could play in order to create in Italy a new political order. The second resides in the crucial 1983 electoral platform: at that moment, Bettino Craxi explicitly asked to be voted as a candidate to the executive leadership, promising in that case to strengthen the Italian role in Europe.

As we know, the message was initially successful and Craxi became the first socialist Prime Minister in Italy. Such an event represents an important turning point in the re-definition of the political scenario in Italy, since coalition politics was for the first time based on the dialectics between two real competitors (Cotta and Verzichelli 1996), and the European issue could increase its relevance with the approaching of a new important “constitutional reform”. Nonetheless, the Psi struggle was under a sort of double tie: within the government area, both the Socialist and the Christian democratic parties were not strong enough to change the general policy guidelines, including foreign and European choices, while the slow erosion of the Communist vote was not sufficient to give Craxi the leadership of the whole Italian left.

The mid-eighties probably represent a peak in the debate on the European integration issues within the three major parties of the *first republic*. If the Pci could celebrate an illusory victory in the European elections of 1984, stressing the success of its critical pro-European positions, both the Dc and Psi leaderships were particularly pro-active in accelerating the economic integration and the path to the SEA. After 1985, the political debate was, instead,

almost totally dominated by internal questions and “negative” issues, like the problem of the alternation between a socialist and a Christian democratic chief executive, and the hard conflicts between the leaders of the two left parties. As a consequence of that, the perspectives of European integration were almost totally neglected in the party congress debates, as well as in the manifestos for the last two elections under proportional representation (1987 and 1992). The reasons of this decrease of interest are numerous: in general, parties supporting the cabinets were showing a more and more evident lack of “policy inspiration” which in a few years would open the crisis of the whole political system (Cotta and Isernia 1996). But this is particularly true for the two most important government actors, Psi and Dc, whose elites were at this point totally unable to manage the new demands. In fact, while the increasing voices about the “costs of the integration” had probably an important role in the escalation of the Northern League’s consensus, the government leaders could not consider themselves as the sole “pro-European defenders”, because the left opposition was now clearly divided between a small anti-European extreme (then converged in the new communist party, Rc) and a fully pro-European left democratic party (plus a number of new actors, all of them characterised by pro-European attitudes, like the Radicals and the Greens).

Therefore, government parties, including PSI, limited themselves to appeal to the necessity to “remain in Europe”, facing the *vincolo esterno* and following the stimuli coming from the supranational arena¹⁸ (Dyson and Featherstone 1996, Radaelli 2002), while the party discourse of the late Pci/early Pds was mainly oriented to reposition its general guidelines, with no discontinuous attention to the single dimensions of the European integration process.

3. The nineties: what is really new when they talk about Europe ?

The following pages will briefly analyse the same phenomenon discussed above, i.e. the variation in the discourse on European integration developed by party elites, but focussing on the decade following the political turmoil started by the general elections of April 1992 (Cotta and Isernia 1996; Bufacchi and Burgess 2001). The data we have collected seem to indicate that, after the ratification of the Maastricht treaty, the European Integration is discussed in a more attentive way than in the past, and also a growing plurality of positions seems to emerge. In fact, figure 6 shows that the decade 1992-2001 presents a reduction of the *identity Europeanism* stances (balanced by a growing functional Europeanism), the

¹⁸ It is not a case that both a powerful interest organisation like the industrial association and a traditionally loyal partner like the Republican party were hardly criticising the coalition, asking a more courageous behaviour in Europe.

disappearance of the “no stances” attitude and a significant presence of both the two categories of Euroscepticism.

FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE

“No surprise”, one could say: the party system transformation in the 1990s deeply affected party attitudes to EU. The forty-year process of preference shaping on European integration that we described above has been replaced during the 1990s by a totally new process. From the table summarizing the documents of the nineties (table 6) we can argue that most parties have been shaping and re-shaping their preferences during the decade. The peculiar features of this process can be roughly summarized as follows:

- 1) A significant discontinuity has been produced at the individual party level, since changes can be found both in single preferences towards specific issues (EU enlargement, Foreign and Security policy, Institutional enforcement, Role of the Commission), as well as in the overall party attitudes towards European integration. In other words, it seems that the European issues became more sophisticated in this time, depending upon a growing number of normative dimensions. This led to more articulate party discourse and forced, even if with some relevant exceptions¹⁹, party elites to take more explicit positions, avoiding the traditional “good willing” or the “don’t complain/don’t explain” mode.
- 2) As a consequence of it, we can see the signs of a slow passage from *vagueness* to *clarity*: in some cases preferences at the individual level are not yet clearly defined at the beginning of this cycle, but they are gradually shaped over time. The most evident case in this respect is perhaps Forza Italia. The newly born party was presented to the voters (obtaining an enormous consensus) on March 1994 with a manifesto quite scarce in references to European Integration. After just a couple of months Forza Italia had to draft a European manifesto, which sounded quite vague, silent on the International role of EU and with a “neutral” position on the estimate of the domestic impact of the EU. This party has moved in recent times into more Eurosceptical positions.
- 3) Eurosceptical stances take a considerable importance over this decade. At some points in time, the number of parties presenting Eurosceptical viewpoints and their overall vote rate is higher than usually acknowledged by the literature²⁰.

¹⁹ Forza Italia, in particular, offers from time to time few hazy stances on the question of the future of integration, providing an evident example of vagueness.

²⁰ See for instance the recent contribution on Euroscepticism by Szczerbiak and Taggart (2002). Furthermore, some pieces of literature devoted to the Italian political change have ignored the Eurosceptical views of the Italian centre-right parties (but also of the new communist party). For instance, Gundle and Parker (1996), Bull and Rodhes (1997).

TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

First of all, we should consider that, apart from the case of the Northern League turning into Euroscepticism in recent times - a case that has often been quoted, but never studied into depth yet - already before the beginning of the era of an *Italian-Majoritarian-democracy-within the European Union*, two parties (Italian Social Movement and the new Communist party) had clearly attacked the traditional Europhilia of the whole system, presenting from both the extreme sides of the political spectrum a set of clear arguments against the Europe of Maastricht (Daniels 1993). At least in one case (the new-Communists) the refusal of the current trajectory of European integration continuously applies throughout the decade. Following our strategy to limit the research to the three main parties of the first republic, we did not code the 1992 platforms of the new Communist party and of the Italian Social Movement²¹. However, we need to note that for the very first time after the Pci conversion, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty saw a significant opposition on both sides of the political spectrum. Moreover, the two parties would transform in a few years from two “excluded poles” into important governmental actors²², without coming before to a total rejection of their initial negative vision of the European Union.

On the whole, during the last decade support to European integration in Italy has not been a unitary issue and it has been even less so in most recent times, when a clear alternation between two opposed political areas seems to be at work (between 1996 and 2001 some partially different centre-left coalitions, after 2001 the centre-right coalition). Exploring these two areas more in detail, it seems that the European issue is today more divisive among right-of-centre than among left-of-centre parties, with the far-left new Communist party (not included anymore in the centre-left cartel since the end of 1998) being the only Eurosceptical party of the left. While in the right-of-centre parties Euroscepticism seems currently to prevail, but the degree of instability is quite remarkable. The case of the Northern League, in particular, is interesting because on the attitudes towards EU this party moved in a decade from the positive to the extreme of the negative pole, thus producing the largest shift in the Italian political system. The European vision of Umberto Bossi’s movement has in fact evolved from a largely pro-European mode, stressing the importance of supranational governance and the need to communitarize a number of policy sectors, to a substantial

²¹ They are, respectively, the *Programma elettorale. Dall’opposizione per l’alternativa*, in “Liberazione”, 29.2.92 (Rifondazione Comunista) and *Ogni Voto una Picconata*, “Il Secolo d’Italia” 10.3.92 (for the Italian Social Movement).

²² More exactly, the MSI, then renamed National Alliance (Fiuggi, January 1995), became a government party already in 1994, while the Communists gave external support to the centre-left government between 1996 and 1999.

critique of the Euro-bureaucracy's centralism, emerged already in 1998 (when the League was running alone) and, above all, after the re-affiliation of this party to the centre-right cartel. This change in the attitudes of the Northern League overlaps with a growing dissatisfaction with the outcomes of European integration, both in terms of institution-building and of impact on domestic party interests. Here we also need to underline that the positive orientation to EU until 1996 belongs to the category that we labelled as functional Europeanism. In fact, the Northern League seems never to develop a sense of full identification with the process of European integration. On the contrary, EU seems to be perceived by the party as a tool to achieve other goals than integration, both in terms of party aims and economic achievements. Overall, the process of European integration seems to be rather instrumental to other party goals and not a goal in itself.

In fact, we can interpret that there has been in the party a sense of dissatisfaction with the process of European integration the party earlier supported, since the process itself changed the pre-conditions to attain the main party goal, that is the self-determination of the more developed northern regions of Italy. At an earlier stage, support to European integration was seen by the Northern League as a tool for the North to exit the nation-state, but in the reality the integration process changed the process where the exit-orientation of the North might grow and so the process itself turned somehow against the party²³. From that point on, the party started to oppose EU with increasingly radical tones. In the end, the picture we can draw is one of a party with no ideological predisposition (positive or negative) towards European integration in an earlier stage, and instead of a party sensitive to the opportunities offered by the European issue to serve other specific party goals. Over time, this party gradually evolved into a soft, but unambiguous opposition to EU, to end up with hard Eurosceptical stances in more recent times.

The other two major parties of the centre-right cartel, Forza Italia and National Alliance, show hints of Euroscepticism at different points in time throughout the decade. Their political discourse moves forth and back from soft Euroscepticism to vagueness to functional Europeanism, where this last is mainly made of a supportive rhetoric of European integration, mainly used in order to gain legitimacy in the domestic, as well as in the international arena. In fact, support to European integration from these two parties is never issue-specific (apart, at some points, from support to a Common Foreign and Security policy), instead it is mainly phrased as support to a general idea of integration. In fact, it seems that contrary to the

²³ "(...) *the Lira joining the Euro changed the situation and the society that earlier was ready to secede was not any longer*", speech of the party leader Umberto Bossi at the Congress of the Northern League, 1-3 March 2002.

Northern League that qualifies more as a protest-based party, Forza Italia and National Alliance have a strategy to alternate hints of support to the general idea of integration to others of issue-specific soft Eurosceptism. An overall attitude that allows to qualify their broad rhetoric into a category of non-radical Eurosceptical parties.

On the whole, the picture (still a bit blurred) on the contemporary Italian parties can be seen in the light of two points of view proposed by the comparative analyses of party attitudes. The first one is the European vocation of social democrats (Ladrech 2000; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2001), that clearly emerges in Italy looking at the Pds/Ds preferences and, more extensively, to the platforms of the centre-left cartel (the *Ulivo* coalition) whose components, particularly the catholic and the left-liberal ones, show very clear hints of identity Europeanism²⁴. No doubt, in Italy, the prevailing idea of Europe in the centre-left camp clearly represents the modern “European socialist view”. Nonetheless, the post-communist origin of the current leadership of the largest party of the coalition and, above all, a growing debate within this party about the costs and benefits of Europe (particularly about the processes of EU Institutional reform), make this picture more confused than in other countries²⁵.

Another argument could also be addresses in order to explain party attitudes to EU: core parties have a better inclination to develop pro-integration discourse and strategies (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2002). Surely, this applies perfectly in the case of the centre-right coalition in Italy: in fact, a strong commitment to a continuous pro-European guideline is at work in some sectors of Forza Italia (formally attached to EPP since 2001) as well as in the small Christian-democratic parties of the centre-right (Ccd-Cdu), whose preferences (uncovered here because of the small size of the parties) can no doubt be classified as a form of pro-Europeanism²⁶. In other words, the “moderate nucleus” of the coalition would present, according to the hypothesis, a stronger pro-European commitment, while the more peripheral

²⁴ Much more problematic is the evaluation of other two components of the Ulivo: the greens and the small party of the *Italian Communists*, the result of a 1998 split from the new communist party, after the latter decided to leave the parliamentary majority.

²⁵ Interestingly, we remember that the three main personalities of the centre-left acting on the European scene are not coming from Pds/ds: Romano Prodi (former centre-left Prime minister and then President of the European Commission), Giuliano Amato (Prime minister and then vice-President of the European Convention) and Lamberto Dini (Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and then representative of the Italian Parliament within the Convention).

²⁶ We are conscious that this affirmation is unverified here. On the other hand, we can argue it both because of the role of moderate Christian democratic leaders within the EPP (where Pierferdinando Casini is vice-President) and also for the continuous appeals, from the same leaders to the allies, to maintain a clear “loyalty to the European commitment”. An evident case was the protection that the small Christian democratic centre offered to the (non party affiliated) minister of Foreign Affairs Ruggiero, who was forced to leave the cabinet Berlusconi II (January 2002) because of a hard conflict with other ministers (specially the ones from the Northern League) on European affairs.

wings (at some points, National Alliance and Northern League) provide more evident Eurosceptical positions.

4. The discourse on European integration before and after 1992. What changes ?

A party/historical comparison based on two dimensions

It is time to summarise the information we have collected in our qualitative analysis, in the attempt to provide a rough quantitative measurement of the changes occurred in the party discourse on European Integration. Since our task is to combine a party by party comparison with an assessment of the longitudinal evolution of political preferences about European integration, we can now build a two-dimensional space where it is possible to locate the empirical distribution of the 129 party documents we have coded. Namely, for each document we will consider the pure distribution of measurements of the broad positions on European Integration (that is, a five point scale from -2 to 2), and a second dimension where the measurement of the perceptions about ECC/EU impact on domestic interests is combined with the historical vision of European integration and with the presence of a solid party unity on the issue²⁷.

The result of this exercise is a simple scatterplot, where the axes reflect the two dimensions described above, and the cases are defined as the means of the measurements for each party by the four historical periods we have taken into consideration. The strong correlation between the score of overall perception of the European integration process (calculated on the bases of the different stances) and our own evaluation about the prevailing content on European integration is confirmed here (0,686 statistically significant at 0,01). However, the distribution of the means over time is significantly fluctuating: as one can see, the pattern of the *first republic age* presents two main features: a certain simplicity of positions in the horizontal dimension and a certain “compression” along the second one. In fact, all the three parties considered here had clear-cut approach to European integration (with the only partial exception of Pci, due to its “conversion” occurred during the seventies). On the other hand, the factionalism within Dc and Psi undermined the “positive” performances on the dimension of the perceptions of costs and benefits of the integration process.

²⁷ More precisely, we have considered a five point scale where 0 corresponds to the sum of two negative visions: the prevalence of a negative impact of European integration for the country and a vision of European Union as negative by-product of American Imperialism/western Capitalism. On the other side, the highest value (5) corresponds to two favourable visions: a prevalence of positive impact of the European integration for the country and the vision of the integration process as a construction of a political union or a federal Europe. A further correction has been applied to those documents coming from a party characterised - at any given point in time - by clear internal divisions. In those

FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE

The pattern of the 1990s seems to be much more complicated: if we can expect a difference between the largest party of the centre-left and those of the centre-right, the internal variations among the parties included in the same cartel (specially in the centre-right), and between one document and another from the same party²⁸ are also quite evident.

Attitudes towards ECC/EU of the Italian political elite: some historical hints

The qualitative and quantitative data we have presented so far shed some light on the changes occurred in the “formation discourse” of party elites concerning the European issues. This evidence should be corroborated by in-depth analyses of other components of the elite attitudes: namely the perceptions and the preferences expressed at the individual level by representatives and party activists.

Unfortunately, there is no systematic information about the pro/anti-Europeanism of the Italian political elite during the long term covered in our analysis, and this makes us unable to produce an historical trend to be compared with any recent data. Nevertheless, interesting historical backgrounds are described by the few elite researches conducted on the Italian case between 1960 and 1980. Looking at these contributions (particularly, Di Renzo 1967 and Putnam 1973) it is easy to see how, until the mid-fifties, Italian political elites reflected the same big divide which marked the public opinion in the country and, to some extent, in the whole Western European scenario: the left was less pro-European while the centre-right showed a natural orientation to the unification of the “free” European democracies. A general tendency towards this pattern is also suggested by an elite survey of the end of the fifties²⁹, whose data tell us that 47% of MPs interviewed indicated the necessity to complete the process of European Integration as a “priority” in the field of International policy. Nonetheless, the low degree of respondents who used to consider the questions about European integration as important indicates a rather ambiguous attitude of the Italian elite: despite the declared Europhilia of a large sector of the government elite, no specific mention of European Integration as a political priority appeared unless stimulated by the interviewer. On the bases of that, one can raise a new working hypothesis: the pro-European discourse

cases, we have added (in case of negative value) or subtract (in case of positive value) a 0,5, in order to reduce the distance from 0.

²⁸ Forza Italia, in particular, shows a consistent range of variation in what concerns the overall content on European integration. Pds/Ds shows, conversely, rather evident variations about the perceptions of the benefits due to the integration.

²⁹ Free and Sereno: *International Outlooks of Political Leaders (Italy)*, February 1958 to April 1958. The aim of the survey was to measure the attitude of political leadership to other nations and to problems in world politics.

of the parties in government can be explained more in terms of elite adaptation to the use of the foreign/European issues than as a sign of real attachment to the priorities that would be suggested by Europhilia.

The conversion, in different times, of the two left parties brought the whole political elite to a fully pro-European mode, which was probably marking its most significant point during the eighties. After Maastricht, the traditionally loyal, but not very specific, pro-European discourse of the Italian elite started developing in a more articulate cluster of positions, covering the different dimensions of the integration process and sometimes stressing its negative consequences. In other words, the European issue becomes more problematic, being less and less linked to a given general image of the international relations (or not useful anymore for reasons of internal legitimisation) but, at the same time, becoming a combination of several policy goals, whose implications are now seen by the political actors both in terms of costs and benefits.

One can take the 1996 data from the first *Top Decision Makers survey*, conducted by EOS Gallup Europe for the European Commission, as the final point of such a long transformation (Spence 1996). These data confirm, in fact, that the large majority of the Italian top decision makers (in particular, the politicians) think to European integration as a positive process bringing only benefits to the country, and they wish further improvements of the European Union, both in terms of enlargement and enforcement of the EU institutional framework. At the same time, the technocratic elite ruling the country in the mid-nineties³⁰ seem to have absorbed a number of concerns about the costs of integration and the necessity to pursue specific priorities in the building of the European Union.

For instance, the net difference between the elite support and the general public support to the single currency is, in 1996, the lowest of the EU (10%, that is 88% - 78%). This figure has two meanings, both consistent with the historical trend: the first meaning is the persistence of trust in the European institutions among the Italian public opinion (in fact, the general public support in the EU15 is only 53%). On the other hand, the elite support to the single currency is in line with the EU15 trend (88% in Italy, 85% in the EU). In sum, before the Euro changeover, the perceptions of European integration of the Italian ruling class is one of a stable "Euro-enthusiastic" elite, who has learned how to distinguish the different connotations of this process. Two sentences from the Italian top decision makers interviewed in the EOS

³⁰ We do not have information about the party backgrounds of the top decision makers interviewed by EOS Gallup in 1996. Nevertheless, we suppose that the technocratic sector of such a sample is dominant: in fact, only 90 out of the 450 Italians included in the sample were elected politicians. Moreover, this sub-group includes, according to the notes of the report, even the members of the

Gallup survey (Spence 1996) are clearly indicating the new doubts which are nowadays characterising the elite discourse: the first³¹, concerning the enlargement to the East and the Mediterranean basin reflects a clear hesitation which is present in the party debates, specially in the centre-right cartel. The second³², adapting an historical citation from a father of the Italian unity, Massimo D’Azeglio, refers to the realistic necessity to build little by little a real European identity, starting from the sub-national and national ones.

The importance of Europe in the political elite recruitment. What new commitments ?

Further data would be anyway necessary to understand the real degree of European commitment among representative politicians at the national level. Unfortunately, we cannot rely on this sort of data, because the feelings on European integration were a recurrent item in the elite surveys before Maastricht. The only opportunity we have is to circumscribe a selected number of “pro-European MPs” using the motivational questions included in short questionnaires sent to the members of the Chamber of deputies during the last twenty years (table 7). Our exercise was to select from the pool of interviews, all those MPs who showed some “territorial vocation”, answering the question *which experience/motivation/event has been the most important in your decision to be candidate to parliamentary elections?*

TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

As the table shows, motivations can be recoded in a handful of classes. A first cluster of motivations refers to pre-political or primary political socialisation. The second one refers to specific events experienced in a more or less direct way by the respondent. The third group refers to a number of (very different) dimensions that we have called *territorial commitments*: reference to the cold war and the international order, or to the need to serve the region (province/constituency) of election, and finally the positive reference to the unification of European democracies (if not a direct indication of European integration process as a political priority).

Selecting the respondents falling in this last cluster can be useful to contrast three elite groups having a really different potential of *formation discourse*, being the first group committed to the need to emphasize the role of the nation state in the context of the

government. That is to say, a small ruling elite which used to be, in the technical executive between 1994 and 1996, almost totally dominated by non-party-affiliated ministers and junior ministers.

³¹ “...I am afraid that this point will cause problems of an economic nature to the Union. To create a free trade area with the Mediterranean basin countries can have indirect consequences on the capacity of our products to stand up in the market”.

³² “... [we need] to start from a real construction of Europe which is also a cultural process. Europe has been made; Europeans are still to be made”.

international order, the second being devoted to the growth of a single region, and the third being more persuaded of the necessity to “federate” the European entities. Before doing that, anyway, we have to highlight a first descriptive element emerging from these data: the marginal role of the European issues in the political formation of the Italian political (parliamentary) class. A role that seems, anyway, to increase in the last two generations of MPs: those born after 1940 and, even more, those born after 1960 are more committed to the European issue (table 8). In other words, MPs elected during the eighties and the ones arriving to the parliamentary scene after the crisis of 1992-1994 seem to have a more pronounced receptiveness of the problems related to European integration³³.

TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE

Until now we did not find anything really new, we just confirmed the mere “indirect” involvement of domestic political elites in the debate on European integration (Katz 1999). Under this point of view, the Italian case does not seem original. On the other hand, we should talk about a rather *deviant case*, because the Italian MPs, in the whole, appear as a strong pro-European group (looking at their political discourse), though with no real European identity under the viewpoint of their political experience, practice and level of information.

Controlling the distribution of the sub-group of Europhile MPs with some other social and political variables, we can discover some interesting evidence that can be summarised as follows:

1. during the “first phase” (parliamentary recruitment between 1972 and 1983) the Europhiles were more diffuse among Christian Democrats and small government parties, while among the MPs recruited after 1983 they are more numerous among the parties of the left. The overall data about MPs from the last twenty years (table 9) show that the highest degree of European support/activism is to be found within the left-wing, but also the centre-right and the right are more supportive than what the Christian democratic centre was able to do until about fifteen years ago.

TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE

2. There is a strong correlation between pro-European attitude and non-political milieu (academics, entrepreneurs, journalists...). On the contrary, the political background, namely the pre-electoral party background, is much less pronounced in the group of the Europhiles

³³ This is also consistent with the thesis of a (relatively) fruitful relationship, occurred in the mid-seventies, between the national party elites and the pro-European and Federalist movements (Pistone 2000). In fact, it is not by chance that two leaders of the “federalists” like Altiero Spinelli and Giuseppe Petrilli were elected in parliament, respectively in 1976 and 1979 (the first as independent candidate by the Pci and the second by the Dc).

than in the other two groups involved in our survey (table 10). This feature entails, almost automatically that...

3. super-Europhiles are generally less connected with a domestic parliamentary career and they tend to lose the elective position before than the others (table 11).

TABLES 10 AND 11 ABOUT HERE

The data on the pro-European attitudes of the MPs elected in the last twenty years cannot provide very robust evidence. Nonetheless, there is room enough to discuss some implications to be tested with the help of further data. We will start from two general arguments showing a certain “discontinuity” in the political elite, and then we will move to some hints of homogeneity between now and the past.

The first point concerns the new “distribution” of the positions about European integration: the Italian top political elite of the nineties has recently shown a certain degree of discontinuity, which is quite different from the “classical” divergence between government and left-wing parties of the fifties. This has to do with the re-shaping of the party system and the emergence of new “non moderate parties” highlighting the costs of European integration and recalling a certain Euroscepticism. We do not have any direct data to show that at the level of MPs’ attitudes. But it is easy to imagine that the natural decrease of some values indicated in table 7 (the liberation war, the defence of public order etc.) has been balanced by values like “patriotism” or the “safeguard of the people from my region”, which can be associated to a sceptical view of European integration. This is consistent with the messages from the electoral platforms of the nineties (see above) and with the results of the most recent elite survey.

The second point has to do with the different feelings of MPs and politicians after the “necessary” acceptance of the conditions imposed by a “vincolo esterno” stipulated some years before: in other words, after being somehow subordinated to the choices of the bureaucratic elite who played the most crucial role at the times of Maastricht, the whole political class came back to “talk about Europe” with a more intense involvement, thus inevitably creating room for divisions and conflicts. Politicians are back on this issue, and this partially reduces the thesis of the de-politicisation of Europe (Mair 2000). Using a slogan, we can say that *when the game gets tough, politicians get into the game*, even if this game does not seem to be the most attractive to them.

5. New party elites between cultural legacies and a growing need to talk about Europe: findings and suggestions

We will try now to summarize the most important findings we have put into evidence so far. Some of the arguments from historical analyses of party attitudes towards European integration have been confirmed by our in-depth analysis of electoral programmes and party internal debates. Italian parties have traditionally faced a remarkable difficulty in forming a real “discourse” about European integration but, on the other hand, each of them used, in turn, this issue to strengthen their role or legitimate themselves in front of the voters. The evolution of the discourse seems to be influenced by a number of “domestic” political conditions: first, the strategic goals of each party in the different cycles of coalition governance (figure 4), which motivate the shifts of the left parties, but also the minor corrections in the attitudes of the Christian democracy; secondly, the need to distinguish an “internal discourse”, oriented to keep the activists close to the ideological guidelines of the party elite, and a “communicative discourse” oriented to meet the demand of an increasingly pro-European public opinion.

The data we have collected also allow us to address the problem of the discontinuity in the attitudes over time. The changes before 1992 have followed a logic of strategic (or ideological) re-positioning mainly controlled by party elites, but without impacting very much on the rather limited salience of European Integration in the communicative discourse. This picture can fit some broader interpretative frameworks like the one on the embedding of the electoral competition in the domestic problems traditionally characterising Italy (Mastropaolo and Slater 1987) and the one on the increasing inability of government parties to develop a comprehensive list of political guidelines (Cotta and Isernia 1996). Also the decisive “conversion” of Pci to the pro-European side looks more like the necessary adaptation of the elite attitudes to new strategic goals, than a dramatic change in the “internal” elite’s discourse.

The impact of the external and intra-party constraints in the formation of “official” positions on European Integration is a critical factor during the *first republic*. Especially within the Dc (but also among the socialists) the shaping of party preferences on European integration was not always a painless process, and sometimes it proved rather problematic, leading to intra-party tensions. In any case, the complicated elite structures in these two parties did not encourage their leaders to promote a more articulate and bold discourse about these issues, limiting the relevant content to a “celebration” of Europe, without introducing more accurate arguments about the costs and the benefits of integration.

During the nineties, we registered important changes, that is to say, more diverse preferences about the future of European integration, and more pronounced judgements about costs and benefits of the process: the documents we have coded seem to indicate that the distribution of the pro/anti-European points of view among the Italian parties is much more scattered than what recent expert surveys report (see, for instance, Ray 1999). Moreover, even those parties maintaining a broad pro-European attitude tend now to develop a more multifaceted view of the European integration process, where the reflection on specific policy aspects (from EMU to enlargement, from social cohesion to CAP) is often controversial. An example of such attitude resides in Forza Italia' discourse: one can easily notice here the co-existence of general appeals to save the "heritage" of the "champions" of Italian pro-Europeanism, but also the absence of concrete stances on the current problems of the European integration process, and even some specific criticisms to a "Brussels-centred" idea of Europe raised by important leaders of the largest Italian party in contemporary times.

Nonetheless, we think that the idea of a "critical change" in the party elite visions of Europe, after Maastricht and after the introduction of a mixed-majoritarian electoral system, should not be overestimated. At the end, the metaphor of the *train to be caught*, quite diffuse within all the elite appeals during the last decade, is something in the middle between two classical modes of dealing with Europe: the idea of keeping a minor but continuous role in Europe, in order to develop the political and economic capabilities of a problematic capitalist democracy (somebody defines it a sort of *Calimero syndrome*), and the need to use supranational politics to defend the national interest - another recurrent argument, strongly evoked during the "socialist era" of Bettino Craxi.

The cross-road marked by the explosion of the party system occurred in the nineties, simultaneously with the beginning of the "European acceleration", created room for a significant change within party positions. Nevertheless, this change is not the fruit of a sudden turning point within the political discourse. On the contrary, it can be conceived as another process of adaptation to some new constraints (or maybe a liberation from the old ones). In the end, most politicians remain involved in a purely "domestic" discourse and the formation discourse on European issues remains, anyway, a very difficult test for the Italian parties.

Therefore, our modest conclusion here is the following: the cultural legacies have an impact on Italian party elites, despite the widespread aspiration to be "European" and to have a prominent role in the problem-solving processes at the European level. On the other hand,

the party system revolution and the formation of two alternative “poles” has somehow helped the growth of different positions ranging from pro-Europeanism to Eurosceptical “voices”.

What implications can we draw from this story? Well aware about the provisional nature of the present conclusion, we just want to raise three points here. The first implication concerns the utility of these data to confirm the argument based on a more evident inclination of the current social-democratic party family to define a pro-European political discourse. An argument supported both by expert surveys analyses (Ray 1999) and intensive comparative analysis (Ladrech 2000).

On the other hand, and this is the second implication, our data seem to suggest that the above argument should be combined with other arguments. Particularly, the argument of the more efficient adaptation to Europe of the “core parties”, closer to the governmental area. The Italian case shows, in fact, that the extreme parties are the most Eurosceptical and that (at least) one “core party” in both coalitions reproduces a positive message in favour of further integration in Europe. In the centre-left coalition this argument is much more easily applicable, while in the centre-right the success of Berlusconi and of his party has reduced the fully pro-European stances, at the moment limited to the voice of the small catholic centre party.

A third implication concerns the persistence of a problematical linkage between internal discourse and external communication that emerges in most Italian party elites today. Even if the debate about Europe is much more active than yesterday, and it is more explicit about costs and benefits of the integration process, the party elites still seem to be unable to transform their general statements into a more articulate strategy.




Figure 1.
Dynamic interaction between party discourse and European Integration. The research design




Figure 2.
Salience of the statements about European Community within electoral manifestoes (parties supporting government). 1948-1953

Source: ECPR Party Manifesto Data

Note: Parties supporting government are Dc, Pri, and Psdi (1948-1987), Psi (1963-1987) and Pli (1948-1963 and 1976-1987)




Figure 3:
Salience of the statements about European Community within electoral manifestoes (left opposition area). 1948-1987

Sources: ECPR Party Manifesto Data

Note: parties from the left opposition area are Pci (1948-1987), Psi (1948-1963) Psiup (1963-1972) and Dp-Pdup (1976-1987)

Table 1. *Party discourse and European Intergration. The database*

Year	1943	
	
	2002	
Party/Coalition	1	Rc. Reconstructed Communist Party. 1992-...
	1,5	Pci. Italian Communist Party. 1948-1991
	2	Pds/Ds. Democratic left. 1992-...
	3	Psi. Italian Socialist Party. 1948-1993
	4	Ppi. Italian People's Party. 1994-2001
	5	Dc. Christian democracy. 1948-1993
	6	Ccd/Cdu. Christian Democratic Centre.1994-
	...	
	7	Fi. Forza Italia. 1994-...
	8	Ln. Northern League. 1992-...
	9	An. National Alliance. 1994-...
	10	Msi. Italian Social Movement (1948-1994)
Type of Entry	1	General election platform
	2	European election platform
	3	Cabinet Inauguration
	4	Party congress debate
	5	Intra-party debate
	6	Other party propaganda
	7	Party leader's press interview
	8	Party leader's speech during parliamentary debate
Title	String	
Is the party In government when producing the document ?	0	No
	1	Yes
	2	External support to cabinet
Relevant mention of European Integration	0	No
	1	European Integration considered in a broader framework
	2	Specific parts of the discourse devoted to European integration
Specific topics: historical vision of European Integration process	1	Negative by-product of American Imperialism/Western Capitalism
	2	Progressive cooperation among member states
	3	Construction of a political Union or a federal Europe
	99	Not applicable
Specific topics: European role in the world	1	No role at all
	2	Europe as an independent peace promoter/dialogue with non western world
	3	Independent Europe/Europe Third force
	4	Europe/Nato Alignment
	99	Not applicable
Specific topics: EU institutional enforcement	0	Against
	1	In favour
	99	Not applicable
Specific topics: EU impact	0	Negative

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on domestic interests	1	Positive
	2	Both positive and negative
	99	Not applicable

Prevailing content about European Integration	2	Identity Europeanism
	1	Functional Europeanism
	0	No stances referring to/ No interest for European integration
	-1	Soft Euroscepticism
	-2	Hard Euroscepticism

Table 2. *A categorisation of party attitudes to European integration*

<i>Attitudes to European integration</i>	<i>Related positions</i>
<i>Hard Euroscepticism</i>	There is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration. The party position assumes that the country should withdraw from membership, or oppose the most crucial EU efforts towards cohesion and integration. Particularly, there is a claim for reversing the direction of the most important processes (Common market, EMS/EMU, enlargement...).
<i>Soft Euroscepticism</i>	There is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU. Or, there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU trajectory. The party has a will to reform Europe
<i>No stances referring to/ No interest for European integration</i>	No mention, vagueness of the party preferences on European integration.
<i>Functional Europeanism</i>	Support for European integration based on a mere “calculus” serving domestic interests or a party goal. There is no commitment to further integration, unless it is proved it would serve such interests. Otherwise, commitment to European integration is mainly in terms of defence of the status quo.
<i>Identity Europeanism</i>	There is a principled support to the EU and European Integration. There is claim in favour of further competence shift from national to supranational arena, eventually of Federal Europe and of a European citizenship. European identity is considered by the party as a component of its own identity and further integration as a party goal.




Figure 4.
Italian cycles of coalition governance and phases of European integration.




Figure 5.
Prevailing content about European Integration. Dc, Psi and Pci (1952-1992).

Table 3. *Qualitative analysis of DC's documents.*

Year	Type of document	Historical vision of European Integration process	European role in the world	EEC institutional enforcement	EEC impact on domestic interests	Party attitude
1952	4	0	4	NA	NA	NA
1954	3	2	NA	NA	1	2
1954	5	3	NA	1	NA	2
1954	4	0	4	1	1	2
1955	5	3	NA	1	NA	2
1956	4	3	3	NA	NA	2
1957	5	3	4	1	1	2
1957	5	3	4	1	1	2
1958	1	3	4	1	1	2
1958	3	0	4	1	1	2
1959	4	3	3	NA	NA	0
1962	4	0	4	NA	NA	0
1962	1	0	4	1	1	2
1963	3	0	4	1	1	2
1963	5	3	4	1	1	2
1964	3	0	4	NA	1	1
1964	4	3	4	1	1	2
1967	4	3	4	1	1	2
1969	4	3	4	NA	NA	0
1973	4	3	4	1	1	2
1975	5	0	4	NA	NA	0
1976	4	3	4	NA	NA	0
1976	1	3	3	1	NA	2
1979	1	3	4	1	1	2
1979	2	2	4	1	1	2
1980	4	3	4	1	NA	2
1981	5	3	3	1	1	2
1982	4	0	4	NA	NA	0
1983	1	3	4	NA	1	2
1984	6	3	4	1	1	2
1984	4	3	4	1	NA	2
1986	4	3	4	NA	NA	0
1987	1	3	4	1	1	2
1989	4	0	4	1	NA	2
1989	2	3	3	1	1	2
1992	1	3	4	1	1	2

Note:

Type of document: 1. General election platform 2. European election platform 3. Cabinet inauguration 4. Party congress debate 5. Intra-party debate 6. Other party propaganda 7. Party leader's press interview 8. Party leader's speech during parliamentary debate

Historical vision of European Integration process: 0. No Historical vision about European Integration 1. negative by-product of American Imperialism/Western Capitalism 2. Progressive Cooperation among member states 3. Construction of a political Union or a federal Europe
NA. Not applicable

European role in the world: 1. No role at all 2. Europe as a independent peace promoter/dialogue with non western world 3. Independent Europe/Europe Third force 4. Europe/Nato Alignment NA. Not applicable

EEC institutional enforcement: 0. Against 1. In favour NA. Not applicable.

EEC impact on domestic interests: 0. Negative 1. Positive 2. Both positive and negative NA. Not applicable

Party attitude: -2. Hard Euroscepticism 1. Soft Euroscepticism 0. No commitment/ No EU salience 1. Functional Europeanism 2. Identity Europeanism

Table 4. *Qualitative analysis of Pci's documents*³⁴.

Year	Type of document	Historical vision of European Integration process	European role in the world	EEC institutional enforcement	EEC impact on domestic interests	Party attitude
1956	5	0	NA	NA	NA	0
1958	6	1	1	0	0	-2
1958	6	1	1	0	0	-2
1958	6	1	1	0	0	-2
1963	1	1	1	0	0	-2
1968	6	0	NA	NA	NA	0
1972	4	0	2	NA	NA	0
1972	1	2	3	1	NA	-1
1975	4	0	3	1	NA	-1
1975	5	2	NA	NA	NA	-1
1976	6	0	NA	1	0	-1
1976	1	2	3	1	NA	-1
1979	6	2	2	1	2	-1
1979	1	2	2	1	2	-1
1979	6	2	2	NA	2	-1
1983	1	0	2	1	99	-1
1984	6	2	NA	NA	2	-1
1987	1	2	2	NA	NA	0
1990	4	3	3	0	0	2
1991	4	3	3	1	1	2
1992	1	2	2	1	1	2

Note:

Type of document: 1. General election platform 2. European election platform 3. Cabinet inauguration 4. Party congress debate 5. Intra-party debate 6. Other party propaganda 7. Party leader's press interview 8. Party leader's speech during parliamentary debate

Historical vision of European Integration process: 0. No Historical vision about European Integration 1. negative by-product of American Imperialism/Western Capitalism 2. Progressive Cooperation among member states 3. Construction of a political Union or a federal Europe

NA. Not applicable

European role in the world: 1. No role at all 2. Europe as a independent peace promoter/dialogue with non western world 3. Independent Europe/Europe Third force 4. Europe/Nato Alignment NA. Not applicable

EEC institutional enforcement: 0. Against 1. In favour NA. Not applicable.

EEC impact on domestic interests: 0. Negative 1. Positive 2. Both positive and negative NA. Not applicable

Party attitude: -2. Hard Euroscepticism 1. Soft Euroscepticism 0. No commitment/ No EU salience 1. Functional Europeanism 2. Identity Europeanism

³⁴ Please note that the last two documents included in the table are no more from the Pci file: they are the 1991 speech of Achille Occhetto in Rimini, during the congress marking the passage from Pci to Pds, and the electoral platform of the new party for the 1992 election.

Table 5. *Qualitative analysis of Psi's documents.*

Year	Type of document	Historical vision of European Integration process	European role in the world	EEC institutional enforcement	EEC impact on domestic interests	Party attitude
1957	4	0	3	NA	NA	0
1958	1	0	3	NA	NA	0
1963	1	2	2	NA	NA	1
1963	4	0	2	NA	2	1
1968	1	2	NA	NA	NA	0
1972	6	0	3	1	NA	2
1976	1	2	3	1	NA	2
1979	6	2	2	1	1	2
1982	5	2	2	1	1	1
1983	1	2	2	NA	1	1
1984	4	3	2	NA	1	1
1984	6	3	4	NA	NA	1
1987	1	0	3	1	1	2
1992	1	2	3	NA	1	1

Note:

Type of document: 1. General election platform 2. European election platform 3. Cabinet inauguration 4. Party congress debate 5. Intra-party debate 6. Other party propaganda 7. Party leader's press interview 8. Party leader's speech during parliamentary debate

Historical vision of European Integration process: 0. No Historical vision about European Integration 1. negative by-product of American Imperialism/Western Capitalism 2. Progressive Cooperation among member states 3. Construction of a political Union or a federal Europe
NA. Not applicable

European role in the world: 1. No role at all 2. Europe as a independent peace promoter/dialogue with non western world 3. Independent Europe/Europe Third force 4. Europe/Nato Alignment NA. Not applicable

EEC institutional enforcement: 0. Against 1. In favour NA. Not applicable.

EEC impact on domestic interests: 0. Negative 1. Positive 2. Both positive and negative NA. Not applicable

Party attitude: -2. Hard Euroscepticism 1. Soft Euroscepticism 0. No commitment/ No EU salience 1. Functional Europeanism 2. Identity Europeanism




Figure 6.
Different attitudes towards European integration by historical phases. 1952-2001

Table 6. *Qualitative analysis of party documents from 1990s*

Party	Year	Type of document	Historical vision of European Integration	European role in the world	EEC institutional	EEC impact on domestic	Party attitude
Centre-left parties							
Rc	1992	1	1	2	NA	0	-2
Rc	1994	2	1	2	0	0	-2
Rc	1994	1	0	2	NA	0	-2
Rc	1996	1	0	2	0	0	-2
Rc	1999	2	1	2	0	0	-2
Rc	2001	1	1	2	0	0	-2
Pds/DS	1992	1	2	2	1	1	2
Pds/DS	1994	2	2	2	1	1	2
Pds/DS	1994	1	2	2	1	1	2
Pds/DS	1999	2	2	2	1	2	2
Pds/DS	2001	5	2	3	1	NA	2
Ppi	1994	1	3	3	1	1	2
Ppi	1994	2	3	4	1	1	2
Ppi	1996	1	3	4	1	1	2
Ppi	1999	2	3	3	1	1	2
L'Ulivo	1996	1	3	2	1	1	2
L'Ulivo	2001	1	3	3	1	1	2
Centre-right parties							
Casa delle Libertà	1996	1	2	4	1	2	1
Casa delle Libertà	2001	1	2	4	0	0	-1
Fi	1994	1	0	4	NA	NA	0
Fi	1994	2	0	4	1	2	1
Fi	1998	4	2	4	NA	1	1
Fi	1999	2	0	4	NA	NA	0
Fi	2001	8	0	4	NA	NA	0
Fi	2002	7	0	4	NA	NA	0
Ln	1994	4	0	NA	1	NA	1
Ln	1994	1	0	NA	1	1	1
Ln	1994	2	0	3	1	1	1
Ln	1995	5	0	NA	1	NA	1
Ln	1996	1	0	3	1	1	1
Ln	1996	8	0	NA	1	0	-1
Ln	1998	4	0	NA	1	0	-1
Ln	1998	8	0	NA	NA	0	-1
Ln	1999	2	0	3	1	2	-1
Ln	2000	5	0	NA	0	0	-1

Ln	2000	5	0	NA	0	0	-2
Ln	2001	5	0	NA	0	0	-2
An	1994	1	0	3	0	1	-1
An	1994	2	0	3	0	1	-1
An	1995	4	2	4	NA	1	1
An	1998	5	2	NA	NA	1	-1
An	1999	2	0	NA	1	NA	1
An	2001	1	0	NA	NA	2	0
An	2002	4	0	NA	1	2	-1

Note:

Type of document: 1. General election platform 2. European election platform 3. Cabinet inauguration 4. Party congress debate 5. Intra-party debate 6. Other party propaganda 7. Party leader's press interview 8. Party leader's speech during parliamentary debate

Historical vision of European Integration process: 0. No Historical vision about European Integration 1. negative by-product of American Imperialism/Western Capitalism 2. Progressive Cooperation among member states 3. Construction of a political Union or a federal Europe

NA. Not applicable

European role in the world: 1. No role at all 2. Europe as a independent peace promoter/dialogue with non western world 3. Independent Europe/Europe Third force 4. Europe/Nato Alignment NA. Not applicable

EEC institutional enforcement: 0. Against 1. In favour NA. Not applicable.

EEC impact on domestic interests: 0. Negative 1. Positive 2. Both positive and negative NA. Not applicable

Party attitude: -2. Hard Euroscepticism 1. Soft Euroscepticism 0. No commitment/ No EU salience 1. Functional Europeanism 2. Identity Europeanism

Table 7. *Main motivation at the basis of MPs political socialisation (1972-2001)*

Motivations	% (N)
Family and/or other motivations from pre-political socialisation	20,5 (142)
Party or Union activism	22,3 (152)
Liberation war, Democratic Instauration, democratic consolidation	10,4 (71)
The "1968", the Youth revolution and Social movements	11,7 (81)
Terrorism, Public order etc.	8,8 (61)
The development of his/her own region	7,2 (50)
Activism in European Movements and for European Integration	7,5 (52)
Cold war and international relations issues	11,9 (82)
N	691

Source: CIRCaP databases, University of Siena.

Table 8. *Selected MPs with different "territorial vocation". Distribution by Age cohorts*

	Born before 1940	Born between 1940 and 1960	Born after 1960
The development of his/her own region	22,8	26,5	32,2
Activism in European Movements and the European Integration	17,5	30,9	35,6
Cold war and international relations issues	59,6	42,6	32,2
N	57 (31,0)	68 (37,0)	59 (32,1)

Source: CIRCaP databases, University of Siena.

Table 9. *Selected MPs with different "territorial vocation". Distribution by political placement*

	Left	Centre-left	Centre	Centre-Right	Right
The development of his/her own region	23,5	25,9	28,3	32,5	25,0
Activism in European Movements and European Integration	37,3	29,6	21,7	25,0	25,0
Cold war and international relations issues	39,2	44,4	50,0	42,5	50,0
N	51 (27,7)	27 (14,7)	46 (25,0)	40 (21,7)	20 (10,9)

Source: CIRCaP databases, University of Siena.

Note:

We have coded as "left": Communist Party, Communist Refoundation, Democratic Left

We have coded as "centre-left": Socialists, Popular party, Democratici, Margherita, Republicans, Social-democrats

We have coded as “centre”: Christian Democracy,

We have coded as “centre-right”: Democratic Centre, Forza-Italia, Northern League,
Liberals

We have coded as “right”: Italian Social Movement, National Alliance

Table 10. *Selected MPs with different “territorial vocation”. Distribution by Party Experience*

	No party experience	Local Experience	National Experience
The development of his/her own region	29,6	29,4	24,7
Activism in European Movements and European Integration	44,4	29,4	22,5
Cold war and international relations issues	25,9	41,2	52,8
N	27 (14,7)	68 (37)	89 (48,4)

Source: CIRCaP databases, University of Siena.

Table 11. *Selected MPs with different “territorial vocation”. Distribution by parliamentary tenure*

	One legislature only	Two legislatures	More than two
The development of his/her own region	20,0	31,3	28,0
Activism in European Movements and European Integration	44,4	25,0	21,3
Cold war and international relations issues	35,6	43,8	50,6
N	45 (25,5)	64 (34,8)	75 (40,8)

Source: CIRCaP databases, University of Siena.




Figure 7.
Party attitudes to European Integration in a two-dimensional space. Means by period

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