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# REACTIONS TO THE 9/11 2001 TERRORIST ATTACK IN COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE US

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## **Abstract**

This article is a continuation of earlier work on the character of public opinion on the international use of military force and its impact on the political process (Everts and Isernia (eds), *Public opinion and the international use of force* (2001), Everts (2002)), which focuses in particular on the factors conditioning the level of support for military actions. The terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001, however horrible in human and deplorable in political terms, have the advantage of offering a unique opportunity to study international attitudes in a situation that differs considerably from earlier conflict situations. The paper presents a description and analysis of the results of the public opinion surveys made in countries outside the United States. It mainly covers the period since 11 September and up to 31 December 2001. The analysis is deliberately comparative and focuses therefore on available data from international polls (including Gallup International and Eurobarometer surveys of Fall 2001).

Poll results are primarily analyzed under the following headings:

- Awareness of and involvement with the problem of the terrorist attacks
- Attitudes on the nature and origin of the conflict
- Support for the military actions taken by the US
- Support for participation of one's own country in these actions
- Concern with possible dangers
- The impact of (expected) casualties on support

Five different factors shaping the willingness to use military force are submitted to a preliminary test.



# REACTIONS TO THE 9/11 2001 TERRORIST ATTACK IN COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE US<sup>1</sup>

## 1. Introduction. A new situation

As a consequence of the end of the Cold War, the question of war and peace has fundamentally changed. First of all, it appeared during the Nineties that the predominant change was one whereby the relative certainty and predictability of the Cold war setting was replaced by diffuse risks requiring a variety of actual or possible uses of the military forces. In addition, new issues emerged in international affairs not only in the areas of national defense and security, but also with respect to the international economy and the global environment. Among the major changes was the (further) emergence of international conflicts that have their origins in domestic issues, arising particularly from the failure of existing states to prevent or to solve what became commonly known as 'ethnic' conflicts. The problems of 'failed states' and violations of human rights achieved a much higher place on the agenda of international concerns. In Western countries 'humanitarian intervention' rather than traditional interstate war became the primary form of the use of military force.

As a corollary, the normative debate shifted from one in which the ethical acceptability of a system of nuclear deterrence and possibilities of overcoming it took a central place towards a debate on the pros and cons of intervention. In this debate 'neo-interventions' came to face 'neo-pacifists'. The former emphasize the right and responsibility of the international community to seek redress for gross violations of human rights while the latter focus their arguments on the risks and potentially negative effects of using military force. This concern gave rise to the 'zero-dead doctrine'. This doctrine is based on the theory that due to a number of changes a situation has arisen in which not only it has become technically possible to wage 'war without bloodshed', but in which this is also the only form of military force that is still thought to be acceptable in democratic systems, except when direct threats to immediate national interests are involved. Humanitarian interventions are generally seen as lacking the quality of such an immediate interest, and thus the public is seen as hardly willing to run the risk of casualties. To some, this (alleged) unwillingness of the public to envisage the incidence of casualties represents an obstacle to a sensible and effective foreign policy and the pursuit of the national interest, which should therefore rather be left in the hands of trusted experts. Others, however, fear that if the concept of a 'war without bloodshed' appears a real

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<sup>1</sup> This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the Joint Conference of the American Association of Public Opinion Research and World Association of Public Opinion Research, May 14-19, 2002, St Pete Beach, Florida

possibility, the public may no longer be willing to restrain the hands of their governments in decisions concerning the use of force (Ignatieff (2000)).

This new situation forces us, therefore, to take a new look at the ancient debate concerning the nature, content and influence of public opinion and its implications for the democratic model concerning foreign policy in general and the use of military force in particular. Strengthening the empirical basis on which it is carried out may further the normative debate briefly referred to above. At least that is the basic normative rationale behind the research programme of which this paper forms a part.

Our knowledge of the nature, content and impact of public opinion in this area of study may have increased considerably over the years, but it still leaves a lot to be desired. Fundamental gaps in our understanding remain (Shapiro, Nacos and Isernia (eds.)(2000); Everts and Isernia (eds) (2001)).

## **2. Limitations of the debate; a new research programme**

In empirical terms, much of the debate has remained limited in three important ways. Firstly, much of the evidence has been based on data from American public opinion and its relationship to US foreign policy. Less attention has been devoted to European publics. A lack of comparable data across nations and across time still poses severe limitations to our understanding of European public opinion and to our ability to extrapolate available findings across nations, although the gaps in our knowledge concerning public attitudes in Europe on foreign affairs, including the use of military force, are beginning to be filled.

Secondly, research has not yet expanded much beyond the examination of the opinion-policy connection relevant to and in the context of the Cold War. As said, the problem of war and peace has fundamentally changed, however, as a consequence of the end of the Cold war and of the emergence of new problems. These changes in the international environment offer a unique opportunity to examine to what extent mass beliefs and attitudes have changed over time in connection with changes in the political landscape or have remained stable, and to specify the extent to which generalizing conclusions reached based on analyses of the Cold war period still hold today and into the future.

This means that a much greater and systematic cross-national effort is needed to increase our understanding of the crucial relationships between public policy and public opinion in a new world of international politics. Such research should cover a wide spectrum of democratic regimes and a diverse set of issues.

Thirdly, this debate has generally overlooked the crucial role that (expected or actual) casualties of war and casualty-related considerations

have come to play in recent years in both the calculations of decision-makers and in the formation and perception of mass opinion regarding the international use of force.

The research project mentioned above aims to contribute to fill these three particular gaps (Shapiro, Nacos and Isernia (eds) (2000); Everts and Isernia (eds) (2001); Everts (2002)). It is deliberately comparative, offering analyses across a wide set of countries (superpowers, medium and small size powers, countries facing the risk of or actual involvement in war as well as countries involved in peacekeeping operations). It aims to explore a variety of situations in which the international use of force is either decided upon or contemplated. It attempts to look at the role of public opinion at both the individual and aggregate level.

The terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001, however horrible in human and deplorable in political terms, have one advantage in this connection, in the sense that they offer a unique opportunity to study international attitudes, particularly on the use of military force, in a situation that differs considerably, if not entirely from earlier situations, either that of traditional interstate war, like the Gulf conflict of 1990-91 or peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention, like the intervention over Kosovo in 1999.

### **3. Modeling the factors shaping the support of the use of military force and their impact**

What determines the willingness of people to (continue to) support the international use of military force? It has gradually become evident from studies of public opinion in either specific historical cases or more experimental, laboratory-type surveys of public opinion that – particularly when looked at in isolation – (1) the *actual or potential incidence of casualties* (be they military or civilian) has a considerable, albeit not decisive, negative influence on the willingness of publics in democratic societies to enter into military conflict, or to continue to do so (See Everts (2002), ch. 9 for a survey of the literature and available evidence). This unwillingness is mitigated or mediated, however, by other factors. The willingness to run military risks and accept the consequences is influenced positively by (2) the degree of threat to what are seen as *vital interests, material and other*. People and states that are not directly and immediately threatened may always ask, moreover why they should be the ones to ‘mourir pour Danzig’ when it is not certain that others will share the burden, and when one may gamble that the collective good will be produced anyway (in this case: by the US); (3) the (real or perceived) *effectiveness and success* of the applied force and, finally (4) the *quality of leadership and/or confidence* in the wisdom of government policies on these matters. If the case isn't made, support doesn't materialize. The three

latter factors can mitigate (if present) or amplify (if absent) the impact of factor (1) (Everts and Isernia (eds.) (2001); Everts (2002)).

Surveys and experiments in which the impact of fear of or opposition to casualties is measured in isolation from other factors tend to lead to an overestimation of this factor. The alleged ‘body bag syndrome’ serves primarily as a useful alibi to politicians and decision-makers and helps them to avoid having to take responsibility for what indeed often are awkward decisions in highly uncertain situations. When looked at in combination with other factors, especially when people are faced with trade-offs and alternative courses of actions, it becomes clear, however, that, despite conventional wisdom, public support for military action is not a knee-jerk reaction (Feaver and Gelpi (1999); Kull and Destler (1999); Kull and Ramsay (2001)).

As far as the impact of public opinion on policy-making is concerned, the distinction between salient and non-salient attitudes is vital. The willingness to act upon one’s convictions and participate in the political process is proportional to the degree of saliency and thus equally relevant as the content of opinions. Yet, saliency is an aspect which many, if not most opinion polls conveniently overlook and is but partially approximated by taking the proportion of ‘don’t know/no answer’ as a substitute.

The presently available data come from a large number of opinion polls. Some of them cover a series of countries and allow international comparisons. Other data allow a preliminary analysis of the model outlined above and to explore the impact of the various factors related to the willingness of people to contemplate or support the use of military force in reaction to the dangers of international terrorism. This analysis is presented below.

#### **4. The available data**

Between 11 September and 31 December 2001 – and, be it much less frequent, since then – a great many opinion polls have been held, in the United States as elsewhere. The truly worldwide impact of the terrorist attacks was reflected in the fact that more than ever before an effort was made to gauge opinions in a comparative fashion in a true cross-section of countries. International polls by *Gallup International* in 37 (September 2001) and 65 (December 2001-January 2002) countries respectively, including a number in Asia, Africa and Latin America, were an important contribution to gather data beyond the traditional focus on the US and Western Europe.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, another poll by Gallup in nine Muslim countries early in 2002 did much to broaden the picture. Several other

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<sup>2</sup> The degree to which sampling procedures permitted to truly gauge ‘national opinion’ in all countries concerned or rather that in major urban areas is not clear in all cases, however. Some caution in interpreting results seems called for.



international polls were undertaken in Europe, including a major effort to explore in considerable detail views on policies and policy options by the European Union in the fifteen countries of the Union (Flash Eurobarometer 114). Together with snippets of information on some countries not included in any of the larger surveys we have now at least some information on some 75+ countries, including most European.

Despite our efforts for complete coverage in the data collection (mostly by consulting and searching the Internet besides newspapers and other sources) some polls may have escaped our attention. Apart from evident differences in frequency and depth of polling practices among countries, this may also be the reason why the success of our efforts to also gather data from individual polls from has probably remained uneven.<sup>3</sup> Available data for France, Germany and the United Kingdom, for instance, are more plentiful than for other European countries, let alone countries elsewhere. For some countries we have just one or two questions. We have to assume that there are still (and will probably remain) considerable gaps and holes in our data set. Yet, the database on which we can base our analysis at present includes some 1800 individual questions and covers a great many issues and aspects of the international struggle over terrorism. Further analyses of these data will follow.<sup>4</sup>

## 5. Saliency; A world-wide impact

One of the most remarkable outcomes of early polling (*Gallup International*, September 2001) and a true indicator of the extent of globalization in the world is formed by the answers to the question when respondents had first learned about the attacks (Table 1). In two thirds of the 24 countries for which data are available more than 80 % of the people had heard about the attacks within two hours of the event, including not only European countries, but also countries like Ecuador, India and Peru. In almost all countries TV was by far the most important source of information.

-Table 1 here -

The impact of the events was considerable. In the EU 80 % said that they were (still) following the events carefully or very carefully.<sup>5</sup> Polls in Germany<sup>6</sup> and the United Kingdom <sup>7</sup> suggest that the problems of terrorism

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<sup>3</sup> A list of all polls (covering some 1900 questions asked in one or more of about 80 countries outside the United States) collected and consulted for this survey is contained in the earlier version of this article and can be obtained from the first author.

<sup>4</sup> A full set of all available questions with their aggregate results will be made available soon via Internet. Until then they can be obtained by bona fide researchers from the first author.

<sup>5</sup> Flash Eurobarometer 114, mid-November 2001.

<sup>6</sup> Infratest, end of September 2001.

had suddenly emerged at the top of the list of ‘major problems facing the country’ (Table 2).

- Table 2 here -

As an aside one could also note, however, that for most countries, this was probably only a short-lived affair. By early 2002 things had more or less returned to normal in this respect, certainly outside the United States. An Italian survey carried out in the second and third week of January 2002 for example found unemployment (with 45%) at the first place, followed by international terrorism, mentioned by 39%.<sup>8</sup> While not permitting to inspect the evolution over time the data from the IPSOS-Reid Global Express Monitor reported in Table 2a suggest that while the public was primarily interested –as is usual – in the economic and social domestic problems, ‘terrorism’ and the related topic of ‘the war in Afghanistan’ were still very much in people’s minds in January 2002, especially in Europe (France, Germany, Great Britain, Spain), but also in countries like Australia, Canada and Japan. In all of these countries, the importance attached to the issue was at a much lower level, however, than was the case in the United States.

To the extent that was a true ‘return to normalcy’, it can also be observed from the rapid drop in the number of polls or poll questions on this issue by itself after the initial *hausse* of September-November 2001.

Given this saliency to both pollsters and the public, it is understandable that governments of countries outside the US (where an exceptionally high number of questions were asked) too became concerned about public opinion, particularly with respect to the question of support of eventual military retaliation of some sort or another. In the Netherlands for instance, it appeared that the government had ordered, for the first time ever, a series of secret opinion polls concerning the issues of terrorism, the results of which were not made available even after the existence of the surveys had become public knowledge.

It is true that in the reprisal actions against the terrorist attacks the United States neither needed nor used the active military support that a number of allies were willing to give them. Nevertheless, in terms of showing the righteousness of their cause, the politically most important question from an American perspective was of course to what extent the United States found not only sympathy and understanding for its military actions but also a willingness to actively share the burden. We shall first look at general support and then to the degree of willingness to actually participate in military action.

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<sup>7</sup> MORI at various moments.

<sup>8</sup> Poll by Selecta.

## 6. Sympathy for military action by the United States

Just after the attacks, when *Gallup International* polled support in 37 countries, it became evident that, given the choice, respondents almost universally would prefer seeking extradition of the suspected terrorists over military action. There were just three exceptions to this pattern: India, Israel and the United States itself, where 72, 77 and 54% respectively had the opposite preference. Replies to other questions too suggest that people were initially cautious. Thus, in the same poll large majorities in all countries felt that in case of military actions civilian targets should be avoided. This was also the favored option in the three countries just mentioned, but again by just a majority.

Moreover, the way in which this question was phrased (and the same applies to many other separate questions in different countries) may have led to overestimating the degree of support. Whenever the question was not asked in the form of a simple dichotomy of 'yes' and 'no', but in the form of presenting alternative options including non-military ones, the outcomes were often rather different and support generally went down.

Thus, for instance in one German poll 58 % preferred that one should preferably use diplomatic means in the struggle against terrorism with 40 % saying that only military force could be effective.<sup>9</sup> In Italy only 10 % preferred 'bombing' and 20 % 'send ground troops' among alternative options including also 'economic sanctions' (49 %).<sup>10</sup> In one poll in the United Kingdom 33 % preferred to deal with countries harboring terrorists by 'diplomatic negotiations', 26 % by 'economic sanctions' and only 34 % by 'military action'.<sup>11</sup> Likewise, albeit in a different fashion, 54 % expressed support in October for proposals for a pause in the bombing to permit humanitarian aid.<sup>12</sup>

The same reduction of support happened when respondents were faced with the possible or likely consequences of military action (unlike the United

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<sup>9</sup> Emnid/n-TV, 24-30 September 2001 (N= 1,000) Text of the question: 'What do you think: In the struggle against terrorism one should preferably use only diplomatic means, or in the struggle against terrorism one should act forcefully?'

<sup>10</sup> SWG/*Familia Christiana*, September 2001 (N=?) Text of the question: 'How should the U.S. react to the terrorist attacks? Should it apply economic sanctions, send ground troops or take bombing actions?'

<sup>11</sup> YouGov/*Observer*, 31 October-2 November 2001 (N=4381). Text of the question: 'Which of the following do you think should be the main focus for action taken against countries that knowingly harbouring terrorist organisations?'

<sup>12</sup> ICM/*The Guardian*, 26-28 October 2001 (N=?) Text of the question: 'Do you agree or disagree with those who say there should be a pause in the bombing campaign against the Taliban to allow aid convoys to go into Afghanistan?'. Another poll suggested the opposite, however. On 1-2 November (MORI, N=603) 53 % rejected a bombing pause and only 22 % supported a temporary or (7%) a permanent stop.

States itself, where these usual corrective effects can not be observed, at least not in this degree) (see below).

Nevertheless, the data presented in Table 3 give an indication of general support to the U.S.. They should, however, be taken with some caution as indicator of general sympathy with the U.S. action. If anything, they show the limitations of support for the U.S. position.

- Table 3 here-

Data from other sources give general confirmation of the degree to which publics reacted differently with respect to supporting the actions of the U.S.

- Table 4 here -

## **7. Support for participation of one's country in the military action by the United States**

Given the at least initial reluctance mentioned above, it is not surprising that there was in the beginning only in a few countries outright majority support for actually participating militarily in actions that would be undertaken against the terrorists. Of the 37 countries polled in September, apart from India and Israel (for obvious reasons), only in member states of NATO (but excluding Greece) could majorities in favor of participation be found at the time (Table 5).<sup>13</sup> That the countries in question reacted lukewarm may have something to do with doubts about that benefits of American foreign policy for one's country. In about half of the countries where a question on this topic was asked in the same poll did the number of respondents who felt negatively about this outweigh those who felt that US policy was generally beneficial. Apart from Israel and Lithuania, there was not a single country where majorities felt the same positive way.<sup>14</sup>

- Table 5 here -

The clear distinction between NATO members and almost all other countries shown in the Gallup poll may be misleading, however. One other poll among the 15 EU members, in which the question was phrased rather differently ('Do you think it an appropriate measure to send [NATIONALITY] troops to fight with the US forces?') showed that of the

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<sup>13</sup> Of the three 'new member states' of NATO Poland and Hungary were not included in this poll, and neither was Belgium. According to one Polish poll in November two thirds of the Poles were opposed to an eventual participation of Polish soldiers in Afghanistan, while one month earlier, 59% were in favour (Yahoo/AFP, 5 November 2001). Data for Hungary are not available.

<sup>14</sup> Gallup International poll, 14-17 September 2001.

NATO members concerned only in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom could clear majorities be found, but not in Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, let alone Greece.

- Table 6 -

To the (limited) extent that the Americans depended on the goodwill and concrete support of their allies the picture had become even more critical, by the end of the year. In almost all countries there was a considerable gap between support in principle and support for actually taking part in the military struggle. This is shown in the last column of Table 5. It turned out that this support had also diminished considerably in most countries since September.

## 8. The balance of support

Bringing the replies to the two questions together and distinguishing five degrees of support, we can now draw a more general picture and reconstruct the geography of support to the US military actions for the 59 countries for which data are available (Table 7).<sup>15</sup> As will be explained below it is not even certain

- Table 7 here -

The results displayed in table 7 are intuitively persuasive and illustrative, first of all, of the rather isolated position of the United States in the world. Of the 59 countries in the survey only 10 can be classified as outright supportive. These include two groups. One consists of the core of 'staunch NATO allies' (but not all NATO members), the other of a few countries that support the US as 'quid pro quo' or for reasons of their own. It is not even true that all of these ten countries are equally reliable in terms of public support, as can be seen by comparing these data to Table 6, where support for sending troops is measured separately for the EU member states. According to these figures Denmark and Luxembourg, would have to move to group 2).

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<sup>15</sup> The coding of the countries for the five categories was: 1) > 50% average support for 'personally agree with US military actions' (table 3) AND > 50% agree with 'country's participation in US military actions' (table 5) 2) > 50% average support for 'personally agree with US military actions' AND 35 - 50% agree with 'country's participation in US military actions', 4) 30-50% average for 'personally disagree with US military actions (table 3)' AND > 50% disagree with 'country's participation in US military actions' (table 5), 5) > 50% average for 'personally disagree with US military actions' AND > 50% disagree with 'country's participation in US military actions', 3) all others.

There is also reason for doubt concerning Norway.<sup>16</sup>

An additional reason to reduce confidence in the robustness of active support to the views and policies of the U.S. among the European allies is provided by a recent poll taken by Pew Research.<sup>17</sup> This survey compared attitudes across the Atlantic (the U.S. on the one hand and France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom on the other) on a number of issues related to the terrorist attacks and the problem of how to respond to it.

-Table 8 here –

- Figure 1 here -

As shown in Table 8 and the corresponding Figure 1, there is a considerable gap between the American and European views on a number of important aspects of the issue. Moreover, majorities ranging from 68 percent in Italy to 85 percent in Germany feel that the U.S. is looking after its own interests only rather than taking also those of its close allies into account. Consequently, majorities (with the exception of the United Kingdom (47 %) also feel that ‘Western Europe should take a more independent approach to security and diplomatic affairs than it has in the past.’

Apart from lack of trust in U.S. policies on the Israel-Palestine conflict, strong differences also exist on the problem of how to deal with Iraq. Unlike the U.S. where 69 percent favored this option in April 2002 (73 % in January), in none of the four countries did a majority share the view that the US and its allies should take ‘military action in Iraq to end Saddam Hussein's rule as part of the war on terrorism’.<sup>18</sup>

Remarkably enough, these different assessments of US policies is not accompanied by a difference in concern and fear about the dangers of Islamic terrorism. In this respect there is hardly a trans-atlantic divide. Relatively speaking, the British were least concerned. At the same time they were the staunchest supporters of the US (Table 9)

- Table 9 here -

One case in this group which merits some skepticism as to whether a majority at the mass level was truly supportive of participating militarily in the struggle was Germany. Again, if put in the form of a simple yes-no question, most polls produced majorities of between 50 and 60 % favoring

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<sup>16</sup> One other poll (MMI/*Dagbladet*, Mid-October 2001, N=?) showed that not more than 40% of the responding Norwegians did ‘agree to the American bombing actions in Afghanistan’.

<sup>17</sup> <http://people-press.org/commentary/display.php3?AnalysisID=46>

<sup>18</sup> See previous note for the source of the data quoted here.

German participation in the military action.<sup>19</sup> When the question was addressed, however, in what specific form Germany should lend military support, it was clear that the respondents preferred by far a supportive role by for instance transport or medical units and not a combat role. This was for instance the case in one poll held in September: 'Should the *Bundeswehr* participate if the US decides to take military action?' 69 % said 'yes but only logistical support'.<sup>20</sup> Likewise, given the option 60 % (and 50% at the end of October) said that Germany should provide transport and medical units only and only 32 (38%) opted for 'also with combat units'.<sup>21</sup> This has nothing to do with a particular German fear of casualties but everything with a political post-World War II tradition of aloofness from anything military outside immediate self-defense in a NATO context, which although changing is still not overcome in this country.

The countries in group 2) include some more hesitant NATO members (Belgium and Portugal among the old and the Czech Republic and Poland from among the new members), as well as some countries that would like to become a future member: Albania and Romania. Israel is a different case. If one were to go by the data for the first Gallup poll of mid-September it would have to move to group 1), as is also suggested by other poll data.

Group 3) includes a mixed bunch of countries with truly mixed feelings, roughly consisting of considerable if not majority support for the measure of personal agreement with the action, but also often equally strong rejection of the notion that one's country should take part in the military actions. Among the European countries it is logical to find traditional 'neutrals' like Finland, Ireland and Sweden in this group, but also to some extent the Baltic countries. In some countries, like Japan and Korea, the situation is different, however, with rather little outspokenness on either of the two questions.<sup>22</sup>

Moving to group 4) we find not only other neutral countries like Austria and Switzerland, but, remarkably, also Spain. In most of these countries

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<sup>19</sup> Although some other polls in September suggested that support was much less (only 39 % in one poll by Forsa/*Bildwoche* and 46 % in another one by Forsa/*Bild am Sonntag*,

<sup>20</sup> Forsa/N 24 TV, September 2001, N=1005. Text of the questions: 'Should the *Bundeswehr* participate if US decides to take military action, and if so, should it also participate with combat units or only provide logistical support?'

<sup>21</sup> Infratest dimap/NDR (27 September- 2 October 2001, N=1300, end of October 2001, N=1000). Text of the question: 'Should Germany only provide assistance with transport or medical units, or should it also participate with combat units?'

<sup>22</sup> The results of an opinion poll by the Nihon Keizai newspaper on September 25 showed that 70% of Japanese adults supported mobilizing the SDF to provide logistical support to U.S. military retaliation for the September 11 terrorist attacks. This includes providing medical care, transport and shipping supplies. But public support was limited to non-combat missions only. (<http://www.khilafah.com/1421/category.php?DocumentID=2309&TagID=2>) 'According to a poll this week, 63% of the Japanese public approves of the military action by the United States, Japan's main ally. But divisions have started to appear over the extent to which Japan should become involved in the campaign'. (*The Guardian*, 31 October 2001).

there is a modicum of sympathy with the US action, but majority opposition to the participation of one's country.

Group 5) is the largest of the five and includes 21 countries or 40% of the whole group. It includes most of the African, Asian and Latin American countries in the survey, but also – somewhat surprisingly - the remaining NATO members Greece and Turkey.

But how representative is this group of 59 countries for the world-as-a-whole? If anything, the rest of the world seems to be even less supportive. On the one hand, there are the Islamic countries, among which one would not expect to find much sympathy for the US position.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, there are a few other countries where support for the US, both generally and in terms of taking part in the military struggle may also be strong, like Australia and New Zealand. This is certainly the case for Canada. In that country 74% agreed for instance in September that they would 'still be prepared to join the war if you knew that it could expose civilians in Canada to attacks by terrorists'.<sup>24</sup>

## 9. Conditioning factors

Let us now look at the factors that have been listed above as conditioning the level of support for military action, to the extent that the data allow us to inspect the role of these factors.

### 9.1 A just cause

Relatively few people in few countries felt outright that there was any justification for the terrorist attacks in the US of 11 September. This was even true in most of the countries with Muslim majorities polled by Gallup (Table 10).<sup>25</sup>

- Table 10 here -

This does not imply that the counterattacks of the US were seen as justifiable in this part of the world, however. The reverse was rather the case,

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<sup>23</sup> 'Ijaz Shafi Gilani, chairman of the Gallup/BRB market research organization in Pakistan, said that a survey taken in 27 Muslim countries after the Sept. 11 attacks found that only 9% of those questioned supported the idea of air strikes against Afghanistan. "This means military action has no support here or elsewhere [in the Muslim world]," he said'. ('Limited, Low Profile Strategy Called Key. Afghanistan: Neither a massive U.S. attack nor token reprisals can achieve America's objectives, experts say. (By Tyler Marshall, *Los Angeles Times*, September 25, 2001 (<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-092501cost.story>)).

<sup>24</sup> Ipsos-Reid/CTV/*Globe and Mail*, 17-27 September 2001, N=1000.

<sup>25</sup> Gallup poll of the Islamic world, December 2001.



as data from countries like Morocco,<sup>26</sup> Pakistan<sup>27</sup> and Palestine<sup>28</sup> show. The American reactions were rejected by three out of four people in each of these countries. It was little wonder then, that these countries were also very low on supporting the US, let alone taking part in the actions themselves. On the other hand, several different polls show that there was a clear relationship between the degree to which the US actions were seen as justifiable and support of the US. The idea that counterattacks were justified was shared by more than sixty percent in each of the, particularly European, countries that were also prepared to assist the US, like Germany,<sup>29</sup> Italy,<sup>30</sup> the Netherlands,<sup>31</sup> and the UK.<sup>32</sup>

As was shown already above, feeling that the American counteractions were justified and sharing sympathy with the US actions, did not imply automatically, however, that one wanted one's country to become involved too. This comes out in another way as well. If we compare for the EU countries the degree to which sentiments and attitudes critical of the Arab/Muslim world are shared with the willingness to use military force in support of the US, it turns out that differences in the former do not correlate with differences in the latter (the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.007 and not significant).<sup>33</sup> Differences in willingness to assist the US are almost entirely due to traditional feelings of alignment versus feelings of neutralism among European EU countries. These two groups form two different clusters.

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<sup>26</sup> CSA TMO Maroc /*Al Ahdad Al Maghribia*, 13-15 October 2001, N=1011 (Text of the question: 'Since a few days, the United States have begun an armed offensive against Afghanistan. Is this action justified, or not?').

<sup>27</sup> Gallup Pakistan/*Newsweek*, 11-12 October 2001, N=978. Text of the question: 'Some people believe that the attack on America was a *Jihad*. Others believe it was terrorism. What is your view?'

<sup>28</sup> Development Studies Programme, Birzeit University, 4-6 October 2001, N=1200 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Text of the question: 'Do you believe that targeting civilians in the attacks that took place in New York is consistent with Islamic Sharia?'

<sup>29</sup> EMNID/n-TV, 12 October 2001, N=?. Text of the question: 'Do you believe the American attacks against Afghanistan are justified?'

<sup>30</sup> SWG/*Familia Christiana*, September ? 2001, N=?. Text of the question; 'Do you believe the American attacks against Afghanistan are justified?'

<sup>31</sup> NIPO/SMK, 24-28 November 2001, N=1020. Text of the question: 'In reaction to the attacks the United States have begun early in October with military attacks on targets in Afghanistan. What is your personal view on the decision to begin with these attacks? (answer categories from 'totally justified' to 'totally unjustified')'.

<sup>32</sup> ICM/*The Guardian*, 16-18 November 2001, N=1004. Text of the question: 'Do you think that the allied bombing campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan, including the use of carpet bombing and 'daisy cutter' bombs has been justified or not?'

<sup>33</sup> EOS Gallup Europe/European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 114.

## 9.2 The role of perceived effectiveness

Most of the polls quoted above date from the beginning of the conflict, September-October 2001. This was before the American counterattacks had truly begun and before the Taliban regime was beaten on the one hand and before it had become clear, on the other hand, that some or many of the feared effects of bombing Afghanistan like renewed attacks or other forms of horizontal and vertical escalation had not or would probably not materialize. It was thus logical to expect that this should have a positive, bandwagoning effect on the willingness to support the Americans, or to join in the military action should this be asked or required.

Surprisingly, these factors did not generally increase support for the American military actions, at least not in those countries for which data from repeated questions are available (including France, Germany, and the UK). Rather, the reverse was true, which may have been influenced by the fact that by the time the second Gallup poll was held the United States government had made clear that it wanted the allies to support and cheer them on, but not their participation in the fighting if that would enable them to claim a say in the way the battle was being fought.

Another indication that perceived effectiveness of the US in fighting terrorism actually played a role in reducing potential support for the actions undertaken by the US can be found in the results of another international poll (Table 11).

- Table 11 here -

Belief in the performance of the US was relatively strong in the countries staunchly supporting the US, like Canada, Germany, India, Italy, the UK (see also Table 5) and weak among opposing countries like Argentina, Mexico and Spain. A similar phenomenon cannot be observed with respect to the belief in the necessity of military force in general in dealing with terrorists (Table 12).

- Table 12 here -

In this case we find not only supporters like India, but also opponents of the US among the believers in military force (like Turkey and Nigeria). On the other hand, allies of the US, like Germany and Italy, do not necessarily believe in the effectiveness of military force. The UK is a case of mixed feelings in this connection.

### 9.3 Trust in government leadership

When leadership is strong and trust in it is high, one can expect a greater willingness to also follow the government when it decides that military force is necessary. While the data do not permit us to compare the direct effect of this factor, we do have some information (although mostly limited to Europe) that underscores that there most people were fundamentally supportive not only of the (initial) decisions of President Bush but also of what their respective leaders governments were doing in the terrorism crisis (comparative European data are shown in Table 13, but they are confirmed for other countries like Hungary and Pakistan).

- Table 13 here -

If data with respect to political leaders from Canada (prime minister Chrétien), France (President Chirac and Prime Minister Jospin), Germany (Chancellor Schroeder and Foreign Minister Fischer), Scotland and the United Kingdom (Prime Minister Blair) and on the confidence in government policies (poll data with respect to France, Germany and the United Kingdom) can be trusted, they were also quite confident about their ability to (continue to) take the right decisions on the various aspects of the crisis. Thus, a corrective effect of dissatisfaction with government policies or lack of leadership in shaping the level of either support of (among e.g. NATO members) or opposition to (e.g. the European neutrals) of military action was probably absent.

As an aside, one should note that in the countries for which we have more detailed data (and with the exception of the confident French and Russians), at best pluralities were confident that President Bush was capable of taking the right decisions on this issue (Germany, Great Britain, Netherlands).

### 9.4 The role of casualties

As noted above, it has become a matter of common belief that the fear of or opposition to casualties has become dominant among the factors determining the degree of public support of military operations, at least in democratic Western countries. Remarkably, this abhorrence is generally seen as applying not only to military casualties on one's own side but also to civilian casualties whatever the side they are on. As two authors aptly put it: 'We [that is: Americans] have grown ever more sensitive about casualties - our own military casualties, opponent and neutral civilian casualties, and even enemy military casualties - and we seek to avoid them.' (Sapolsky and Shapiro 1996). But if it is true, it is not an American phenomenon only.

To many an American it is particularly the Europeans who have gotten weak knees that make them refuse to act 'when the going gets rough'. To

some extent it has become an article of faith that the public will only support a 'war without bloodshed'. However much can be said against this 'body bag hypothesis' and however weak the evidence may be (see Everts 2002 for evidence), this idea continues to be popular among politicians and other observers. Decision makers continue to anticipate an expected unwillingness to tolerate casualties. The reason for this may well be that this belief serves as a perfect alibi for responsible decision makers to avoid having to take difficult and risky decisions, for which one may well fear to be held accountable (Everts 2002).

What can we say about this phenomenon in connection with the terrorist attacks and the 'war on terrorism'? The available data offer little possibility to explore this problem in detail. However, they do allow us to look at the problem from three perspectives.

One way in which the fear of casualties may be at work is in the difference between support of military actions in general and support of actions that may entail risks for oneself or the soldiers of one's country. This might be called the 'hypocrisy factor'. Above (Table 5), it was shown already that there is indeed a considerable gap in this respect. It was absent (or nearly absent) only in those countries that were either strong supporters of the US and fully willing to share the burden or where the opposite view predominated. It was relatively strong among those who either had mixed feelings or where opinions were very much divided.

One may wonder, however, whether hypocrisy is the right word here, reflecting as it does an one-sided, mostly American perspective. In fact, other factors, such as considerations of involvement, interest and responsibility, in combination with more understanding of the Arabic/Islamic cause or a different assessment of chances and risks may well be decisive here.

The second and third perspective is that of the prospect of casualties addressed directly, in the form of military or that of civilian casualties respectively.

Taking the problem of civilian casualties first, there are, unfortunately, only a few poll questions available in which this problem has been explicitly addressed. To these we now turn.

It is notable that the likelihood that civilians would be killed (and its policy implications) is not considered in the same way in all countries concerned. Thus, in the Gallup poll of December 2001 respondents were asked whether there were any aspects of the war about which they were particularly concerned (Table 14).<sup>34</sup>

- Table 14 here -

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<sup>34</sup> A puzzling outcome in this connection (Table 14) is the relatively much lower overall levels of concern in Germany, Spain and Russia compared to almost all other European countries

There were remarkable differences in the degree to which respondents mentioned the problems connected with bombing of civilians in Afghanistan (and the related problem of the Afghan refugees). This was mentioned by very few in for example most Latin American countries, but also in Germany, Russia and Spain. Large majorities, on the other hand, mentioned it in such different countries as Hong Kong, Malaysia, Belgium, Luxembourg (but not the Netherlands), Bosnia and Estonia. However, it turned out that there was no correlation whatsoever between the degree of concern with either bombing civilians and the refugees and the degree to which people in countries personally supported the US actions or favored participation of one's country in these actions. Neither does less concern with future hijackings or bomb attacks per se have a positive effect on such support (see for data Tables 5 and 14).

This lack of correlation can also be observed by comparing data from some individual countries. For example in Canada three out of four respondents (strongly) agreed that Canada 'should join the US and declare war on terrorism'. Of these, 74 % also answered 'yes' on the follow-on question – 'Would you still be prepared to join the war if you knew that it could expose civilians in Canada to attacks by terrorists?'<sup>35</sup> The evidence from Great Britain, on the other hand presents a mixed and more different picture. When the question was first asked twice, in September 2001, 75 % supported 'taking military action if the United States can identify the groups or nations responsible for this week's attacks'. Then, a follow-on question was asked: 'What if it meant innocent civilians in other countries might be hurt or killed? In that case would you support or oppose taking military action?' Now, support was reduced to 43% and opposition rose to 46%.<sup>36</sup>

A similar effect could be observed in another poll at about the same time: 'Should the United States and its allies, or should they not, be prepared to take military action against countries believed to be giving aid and comfort to last week's terrorists?' 70 % said they should and 20 % 'should not'. When the possibility of civilian casualties was mentioned to those who had expressed their support, this support dropped considerably, to 67% (or 48 % of the whole sample).<sup>37</sup> On the other hand, when the question was phrased rather differently, it seemed as though the prospect of civilian casualties would not have much affect on the position on the use of military force, with 18 % stating that they were against military force anyway and 50% stating

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<sup>35</sup> Ipsos-Reid/CTV/*Globe and Mail*, 17-27 September 2001, N=1000. Text of the question: 'I'm now going to read you some statements about last week's terrorist attacks and the United States' declaration of war on terrorism. For each one, I'd like you to tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree. The first one is: - We should join the United States and also declare war on international terrorism.'

<sup>36</sup> MORI, 14 and 21 September 2001, N=500 and N=513.

<sup>37</sup> Gallup/*Daily Telegraph*, 17-18 September 2001, N=606. Text of the question: 'Would you or would you not still support military action against such countries even if it led to a substantial number of civilian casualties in countries like Afghanistan?'

that no number of Afghani civilian casualties would make them change their mind (Table 15).

- Table 15 here -

The situation was rather different, though, in the cases of France and the Netherlands. In the first country, a considerable majority (61%) agreed (completely) that ‘the war on terrorism would justify that France takes the risk of reprisals in the form of attacks against the French territory’, but in reply to another question (‘To combat terrorism the United States threaten to hit militarily one or more countries where terrorist groups are located. Do you personally think that struggle against terrorism justifies to take the risk of killing innocent civilians?’) only 20% answered with ‘yes’ and 77 % with ‘no’.<sup>38</sup> This suggests strongly that the expectation of civilian casualties does have a serious negative effect on the willingness to support military action. This effect was confirmed by a poll from the Netherlands. It asked: ‘How acceptable is the degree to which the population in Afghanistan has been hit by the American attacks?’ The results (Table 16) show that less than half of those questioned had no qualms about civilian casualties, whereas the number of those who did cannot be reconciled by the high levels of support for military action that came out of other polls.<sup>39</sup>

- Table 16 here -

The third perspective is that of expected or possible military casualties. Again, the relevant data are very limited, and what we have should be treated with care. One poll, from the Netherlands suggests a considerable willingness to take casualties into the bargain.<sup>40</sup> 66% agreed that the Netherlands should ‘continue to take part in operations against terrorism if this would cause casualties among our military forces’, which was a similar level as recorded earlier in the case of the war over Kosovo (and much more than with respect to a recent peacekeeping operation in which the Netherlands also took part)(Table 17).<sup>41</sup>

- Table 17 here -

Similar attitudes appeared when a similar question was asked in the United Kingdom: ‘If necessary, America and Britain should be willing to risk

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<sup>38</sup> Ipsos/BFM /*Le Point* , 21-22 September 2001, N=929.

<sup>39</sup> NIPO/SMK, 24-28 November 2001.

<sup>40</sup> NIPO/SMK, 24-28 November 2001, N=1020.

<sup>41</sup> This is confirmed by the relatively (compared to other European countries) low levels of concern with Afghan civilian casualties (which could also be observed in France, Germany and Portugal (countries where sympathy for the US actions was high) (Table 13).

the lives of their own troops to track down Bin Laden and overthrow the Taliban regime'(see Table 18).

- Table 18 here -

Other outcomes suggest more support for the casualties hypothesis, however. In the Gallup/*Daily Telegraph* poll quoted above, respondents were also faced with a follow-on question after gauging initial support for military action, to see what effect the prospect of ('substantial') military casualties might have.

Like in the case of civilian casualties mentioned above, the prospect of military casualties too reduced support for military action considerably (in this case to 48 % of the full sample), and in this case the number of people stating that no number of military casualties would make them change their mind, though still considerable, was less than noted above (Table 15).

Finally, the case of France, reinforces the conclusion that the prospect of casualties did indeed (for about half of the respondents) have a negative impact on the aggregate willingness to enter into military action (Table 19).

Table 19 here

In all of the cases discussed here we are dealing, however, with cases where the risks were largely hypothetical at the time the questions were asked.

## **10. Some conclusions**

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were truly a matter of worldwide shock and concern. The degree of globalization in the world was remarkably illustrated by the fact that within two hours about 80 % of the world's population appeared to have heard of them. However, public opinion in the world reacted very differently to the attacks and to the consequent American countermeasures. Apart from small pockets in the Arab/Islamic world, where sympathy with or at least understanding of the terrorist acts prevailed, there was much sympathy for the American plight, but also considerable caution with respect to the possible reactions, resulting in a preference for peaceful over military means and for avoiding civilian targets. Given this caution, it is not surprising that only in a very limited number of countries (mostly West-European but including Canada, Israel and India) there was a majority supporting the military counterattacks by the US. Also understandable to some extent was the fact that even fewer people supported the participation of their own country in these military actions.

Out of some 60 countries for which polling data are available, only one sixth can be classified as truly supportive of the US. No fewer than 40%

should be classified as outright opposed. Support, moreover, declined considerably between September and December 2001.

The available data at present allow only a limited test of the factors which earlier research has shown to be of influence, either positively or negatively, in shaping the level of support for (possibly risky) use of military force. The main factor determining support for the Americans appears to be traditional general political alignment and geopolitical/geographic situation. This means that only those countries that felt truly allied to the US were able to resist and overcome the *free rider temptation*, i.e. for public opinion to ask why their country and not others should come to the aid of the Americans

With respect to the role of what can be labeled *a just cause* it became evident that feeling that the American counteractions were justified and consequently sharing sympathy with the US actions, did not imply automatically that one wanted one's country to become involved too.

The evidence for the positive influence that the *effectiveness of the use of force* exercises on the support for such use, is mixed in this case. There was certainly no bandwagoning effect in the sense that the perceived success in the struggle against Bin Laden and the Taliban regime led to increased support of the military actions. At the level of mass opinion the contrary seems to have happened as the diminution of international support shows. This effect may also be due, however, to the fact that the US government itself made clear that it did not want allied support if that implied a claim to access to decision making. Supporters of the US, however, also tend to believe in the effectiveness of American policies and, to a lesser extent, that military force is essential in the struggle against terrorism.

*Leadership and trust in government policies* tend to increase the willingness of people to support military action. The available evidence supports the conclusion that, negatively speaking, lacking confidence was not operative as a factor reducing support for the US and restraining the willingness of people to follow their governments in the use of force.



**Table 1 When did you first hear about the terrorist attacks in New York?**

- 'When did you first hear about the attacks in New York?' (code in local time)

14-17 2001	September	zero hour	zero hour +1	zero hour +2	zero hour +3	zero hour +4
	Argentina	67	14	9	3	1
	Bosnia	45	25	13	6	5
	Bulgaria	23	23	22	10	9
	Croatia	56	13	11	5	4
	Czech Rep.	23	18	16	14	12
	Denmark	56	23	10	0	7
	Ecuador	74	9	10	2	2
	Estonia	36	22	16	7	7
	Germany	58	20	10	5	3
	India	49	32	6	0	3
	Israel	84	7	2	1	1
	Italy	61	20	6	3	3
	Korea	32	27	5	1	1
	Lithuania	45	35	13	2	1
	Luxembourg	55	18	13	7	4
	Mexico	57	14	8	9	1
	Pakistan*	0	0	0	0	0
	Peru	50	19	10	5	5
	Portugal	72	10	5	4	3
	South Africa	48	12	6	10	0
	Switzerland	48	22	20	5	1
	Ukraine	8	12	37	14	11
	United Kingdom (ex NI)	61	19	9	4	4
	USA	68	14	9	5	2
	Zimbabwe	35	11	14	18	2

	zero hour + 5	Later than that but still on Tuesday (NY time)	Later than this, i.e. Wednesda y (NY time)	Haven't heard before now	Don't know No answer
Argentina	1	3	2	0	0
Bosnia	2	2	2	0	0
Bulgaria	5	5	3	0	0
Croatia	2	5	3	0	1
Czech Rep.	8	7	2	0	0
Denmark	0	2	0	0	2
Ecuador	0	2	1	0	0
Estonia	1	3	6	0	2
Germany	1	0	1	0	2
India	6	0	5	0	0

Israel	1	1	1	0	2
Italy	3	2	1	0	1
Korea	1	24	4	0	5
Lithuania	1	0	2	0	1
Luxembourg	1	0	1	0	1
Mexico	3	9	0	0	0
Pakistan*	-	78	18	3	1
Peru	2	7	2	0	0
Portugal	3	2	1	0	1
South Africa	0	15	8	0	1
Switzerland	1	1	1	0	1
Ukraine	3	2	11	0	1
United Kingdom (ex NI)	0	1	2	0	0
USA	1	0	1	0	0
Zimbabwe	2	1	15	0	2

\* In Pakistan the question was simplified to two options SAME DAY and NEXT DAY.

Gallup International poll. N per country unknown

**Table 2 What is most important issue facing Britain today? (United Kingdom)**

- 'What would you say is the most important issue facing Britain today?'
- 'What do you see as other important issues facing Britain today?'

	27/09/02 (N=1011)		18-22/10/02 (N=1016)		22-27/11/02 (N=1032)		24-28/01/02 (N=1955)	
	most important	other important	most important	other important	most important	other important	most important	other important
Defence/foreign affairs/international terrorism	48	60	46	57	26	40	6	13
Race relations/immigration/immigrants	12	27	7	17	5	12	8	16
National Health Service/Hospitals	8	43	14	49	21	49	40	66
Education/schools	4	30	5	31	5	29	6	32
Crime/law & order/violence/vandalism	3	15	3	14	7	19	6	23
Economy/economic situation	3	15	3	12	6	15	6	12
Unemployment/factory closure/lack of industry	2	11	5	12	4	14	3	9
Common Market/EU/Single European currency	2	9	2	7	9	29	5	13

REACTIONS TO THE 9/11 2001 TERRORIST ATTACK IN COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE US

Other (less than 2 resp. 9 percent) not included									
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MORI/Political Attitudes in Britain/*The Times*

**Table 2a The public's priorities in January 2002**

- Thinking of all the issues presently confronting your country, which one do you feel should receive the greatest attention from your country's leaders?

19 November – 17 December 2001	Economy	Society/Social services	Government system/spending	Terrorism	Afghanistan	Other international	Other	DK	N
Argentina	65	24	5	2	1	-	2	1	500
Australia	18	22	2	13	12	8	17	8	500
Brazil	33	58	3	1	1	-	4	1	556
Canada	21	28	4	15	7	5	13	8	500
China	56	20	10	4	1	1	5	3	508
Colombia	35	45	2	13	-	1	4	-	500
France	18	46	2	19	2	1	4	7	501
Germany	28	9	2	15	17	6	16	7	503
Italy	36	34	5	4	7	3	4	7	500
Japan	45	3	6	22	7	8	9	1	500
Mexico	44	40	4	6	1	1	3	1	503
Poland	65	19	7	2	1	4	6	-	500
Portugal	14	64	5	4	7	2	6	4	501
South Africa	39	54	3	1	-	-	3	0	500
South Korea	51	18	12	1	1	-	9	6	541
Spain	17	23	2	33	7	2	7	9	521
Taiwan	58	14	2	-	-	-	12	12	519
Turkey	69	4	3	-	-	-	2	1	525
Un. Kingdom	6	32	1	8	19	4	12	18	500
United States	16	15	3	28	17	5	9	8	1000

IPSOS-Reid, Global Express Monitor, January 2002

**Table 3 Agreement with the US military action in Afghanistan?**

‘Do you personally agree or disagree with the United States military action in Afghanistan?’

November- December 2001	Agree	Disagree	Don't know/ No answer
Albania	83	11	6
Argentina	14	67	19
Austria	36	43	21
Azerbaijan	14	72	14
Belgium	52	34	14
Bolivia	23	72	8
Bosnia	22	60	18
Bulgaria	34	41	26
Cameroon	28	58	14
Colombia	41	49	10
Costa Rica	42	49	9
Croatia	40	45	16
Czech Rep.	69	23	9
Denmark	66	19	15
Dominican Rep.	44	53	3
Ecuador	36	55	9
Estonia	52	41	7
Finland	52	23	25
France	73	20	7
Georgia	38	32	33
Germany	65	28	7
Greece	9	81	10
Guatemala	46	51	3
Hong Kong	45	46	9
Iceland	59	26	15
India	70	27	3
Ireland	48	34	18
Israel	83	8	9
Italy	60	31	9
Japan	33	26	41
Kenya	56	37	6
Korea	43	44	13
Kosovo	68	21	11
Kyrgyzstan	47	44	9
Latvia	40	33	26
Lithuania	54	33	12
Luxembourg	61	31	9
Macedonia	28	58	14
Malaysia	13	67	20
Mexico	21	73	6
Netherlands	75	17	9
Nigeria	40	44	16
Norway	55	35	11
Pakistan	8	82	10

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Panama	43	45	12
Peru	38	60	2
Philippines	57	39	4
Poland	61	28	11
Portugal	59	29	12
Romania	53	29	18
Russia	39	50	11
Slovak Rep.	53	37	10
Spain	34	49	17
Sweden	53	29	19
Switzerland	47	37	16
Turkey	16	69	14
Ukraine	26	60	14
United Kingdom (ex NI)	68	20	12
Uruguay	29	67	13
USA	89	6	5
Venezuela	53	38	9
Yugoslavia	26	62	12
Zimbabwe	17	51	32

Source: Gallup International. N per country unknown

**Table 4 Support of US air strikes against Afghanistan**

‘As you know, the United States has launched military strikes on targets in Afghanistan –including military sites of the Taliban government, and training camps of the Al Qaeda group led by Osama bin Laden. All things considered, do you support or oppose these US-led air strikes on Afghanistan?’

12 November-16 December 2001	Support	Oppose	Don't know
Argentina	13	77	10
Canada	66	23	11
China*	28	52	20
France	60	25	15
Germany	60	32	8
Italy	58	30	12
Japan	49	44	7
South Korea	43	50	7
Spain	31	52	17
Turkey	18	70	12
United Kingdom	65	19	16
United States	88	7	5

IPSOS-Reid, N= not known

**Table 5 Agreement to COUNTRY participating in US military action in Afghanistan?**

- Some countries and all NATO member states have agreed to participate in the military action against Afghanistan. Do you agree or disagree with that YOUR COUNTRY should take part with the United States military action against Afghanistan?

14-17 September 2001 November-December 2001	Agree, country should take part	Disagree, country should not take part	Don't know	<i>Difference between support of US in general (table 3 ) and participation of one's own country in military action (% agree)</i>
Albania	54	32	14	29
Argentina	20 7	77 89	3 4	7
Austria	14 6	82 85	4 9	30
Azerbaijan	12	72	17	2
Belgium	50	42	7	2
Bolivia	14	83	3	9
Bosnia	43 9	47 74	10 17	13
Bulgaria	21 14	66 63	13 23	20
Cameroon	14	75	11	14
Colombia	40 25	57 70	3 5	16
Croatia	36 18	56 70	9 12	22
Czech Rep.	55 48	34 41	11 11	21
Denmark	80 64	13 30	7 8	1
Dominican Rep.	27	69	4	17
Ecuador	35 12	64 83	1 5	24
Estonia	38 27	53 71	9 2	25
Finland	8 7	83 84	9 9	45
France	73 67	23 28	4 5	6
Georgia	15	64	22	23
Germany	53 58	43 38	4 4	7
Greece	29 7	60 86	11 7	2
Guatemala	45	53	2	1
Hong Kong	24	69	7	19
India	86 85	8 12	6 3	-15

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Ireland	32	59	19	16
Israel	66	29	5	
	36	58	6	47
Italy	66	26	8	
	57	38	5	3
Japan	21	39	40	12
Kenya	32	63	5	24
Korea	46	42	12	
	40	49	12	3
Kosovo	59	24	17	9
Kyrgyzstan	21	72	7	26
Latvia	24	66	10	
				16
Lithuania	41	49	10	
	16	73	11	28
Luxembourg	74	18	8	
	57	37	5	4
Macedonia	13	74	13	15
Malaysia	4	77	19	9
Mexico	21	78	1	
	10	89	1	11
Netherlands	66	20	14	
	66	25	9	9
Nigeria	22	63	15	18
Norway	58	32	10	
	53	42	6	2
Pakistan	32	67	6	
	12	71	17	-4
Panama	30	75	5	
	17	80	3	26
Peru	46	52	2	
	19	78	3	19
Philippines	34	64	2	23
Poland	48	41	11	13
Portugal	70	23	7	
	45	47	8	13
Romania	40	52	8	
	39	42	19	14
Russia	11	79	10	28
Slovak Rep.	32	58	10	21
Spain	58	37	5	
	33	50	7	1
Sweden	26	64	10	27
Switzerland	28	65	7	
	12	76	12	35
Turkey	14	71	15	2
Ukraine	12	79	9	
	4	90	6	22
United Kingdom (ex NI)	79	12	9	
	68	25	9	0
Uruguay	6	90	4	22

Venezuela	6 <i>29</i>	91 <i>62</i>	3 <i>9</i>	<i>24</i>
Yugoslavia	<i>8</i>	<i>81</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>18</i>
Zimbabwe	27 <i>7</i>	69 <i>65</i>	4 <i>28</i>	

Gallup International N per country unknown

Data in italics refer to the poll taken in November-December 2001

**Table 6 Which measures should be taken?**

- In any case [COUNTRY] is to take or has already taken decisions about which policy should be applied now. Among the following measures which ones seem appropriate to you ...?

- to send [NATIONALITY] troops to fight with the US forces

13-23 November 2001	Yes	No	Maybe if...	No opinion	N
Austria	8	86	3	3	1000
Belgium	43	51	3	3	959
Denmark	43	45	9	3	1000
Finland	5	91	3	1	1001
France	54	41	4	2	1007
Germany	55	38	4	3	1001
Greece	5	90	3	2	1000
Ireland	26	67	6	2	1000
Italy	51	45	2	2	1001
Luxembourg	43	49	4	4	1000
Netherlands	61	33	4	2	1002
Portugal	26	58	10	5	1002
Spain	32	58	6	5	1007
Sweden	20	74	3	3	1000
United Kingdom	66	17	16	2	1006
EU 15	48	43	6	3	--

EOS Gallup Europe/European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 114



**Table 7 The geography of support of the US military actions**

1) <i>Very supportive</i>	2) <i>Rather supportive</i>	3) <i>Mixed feelings</i>	4) <i>Rather opposed</i>	5) <i>Strongly opposed</i>
Canada Denmark France Germany India Italy Kosovo Luxembourg Netherlands Norway United Kingdom	Albania Belgium Czech Republic Israel Poland Portugal Romania	Finland Georgia Ireland Japan Kenya Korea Kyrgyzstan Latvia Lithuania Slovak Republic Sweden Venezuela	Austria Colombia Croatia Hongkong Nigeria Philippines Spain Switzerland	Argentina Azerbaijan Bolivia Bosnia Bulgaria Cameroon Dominican Rep. Ecuador Greece Guatemala Macedonia Malaysia Mexico Pakistan Panama Russia Turkey Uruguay Yugoslavia Zimbabwe

**Table 8 Approval of U.S. policies**

‘As I read some specific US policies tell me if you approve or disapprove of them. [READ AND ROTATE]’

- The U.S. led military campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan

2002, 2-10 April	Approve	Disapprove	Don't know	N
France	64	30	6	1012
Germany	61	31	8	1021
Italy	59	37	4	1000
United Kingdom	73	18	9	1009
United States	83	10	7	1362

- President Bush calling Iraq, Iran and North Korea an Axis of Evil

2002, 2-10 April	Approve	Disapprove	Don't know	N
France	27	62	11	1012
Germany	17	74	9	1021
Italy	29	60	11	1000
United Kingdom	37	35	13	1009
United States	56	34	10	1362

- The US decision to place tariffs on steel imports to the US

2002, 2-10 April	Approve	Disapprove	Don't know	N
France	11	81	8	1012
Germany	14	74	12	1021
Italy	17	58	25	1000
United Kingdom	17	65	18	1009
United States	49	27	24	1362

- The US decision to try Al Qaeda prisoners before military tribunals rather than in the US civilian courts

2002, 2-10 April	Approve	Disapprove	Don't know	N
France	40	51	9	1012
Germany	50	40	10	1021
Italy	46	45	9	1000
United Kingdom	45	38	14	1009
United States	61	24	15	1362

- President Bush's decision to increase US foreign aid to poor countries

2002, 2-10 April	Approve	Disapprove	Don't know	N
France	90	8	2	1012
Germany	86	12	2	1021
Italy	95	4	1	1000
United Kingdom	90	8	2	1009
United States	53	36	11	1362

FORM 2 ONLY:

- US policies in the Middle East

2002, 2-10 April	Approve	Disapprove	Don't know	N
France	26	63	11	495
Germany	25	63	12	518
Italy	39	51	10	463
United Kingdom	36	39	25	503
United States	55	26	6	695

PEW Research Centre

**Table 9 Worried about Islamic terrorism?**

- How much do you worry about the possibility of Islamic terrorism in (name of country) these days? Are you

2002, 2-10 April	Very worried	Somewhat worried	Not too worried	No worried at all	DK/NA	N
France	18	42	29	10	1	1012
Germany	17	46	25	11	1	1021
Italy	21	38	30	11	*	1000
United Kingdom	16	40	31	13	*	1009
United States	22	45	22	11	*	1362

PEW Research Centre

**Table 10 WTC attacks justifiable?**

‘There are many types of actions that people take in their lives. As I read off different types of actions, one at a time, would you tell me the degree to which you can think that action is morally justifiable or morally unjustifiable? To indicate your answer, please select any number from one to five. If you think the action is totally unjustifiable morally, chose a one. If you think the action is totally justifiable morally, choose a five. If your answer is somewhat between these positions, select a two, three or four. The lower the number, the more you think it is morally justifiable’.

- The attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York

December 2001	1 (Totally unjustifiable)	2	3 (Neither one nor the other)	4	5 (Totally justifiable)	Don't know	N
Indonesia	74	10	12	2	2	-	1050
Iran	51	18	11	5	8	7	1501
Jordan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	757
Kuwait	26	12	25	12	18	7	790
Lebanon	61	8	10	7	13	1	1010
Morocco	48	22	9	5	3	13	1000
Pakistan	40	21	18	7	11	3	2043
Saudi Arabia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	740
Turkey	55	22	13	6	3	1	1019

Gallup Poll of the Islamic World

**Table 11 Performance in reducing terrorism: USA**

‘What do you think of the performance of the USA in reducing terrorism?’

5 October- 26 November 2001	Good	Poor	Don't Know	N
Argentina	30	78	2	
Canada	61	34	5	1000
Chili	46	46	8	1000
France	40	47	13	1000
Germany	60	38	2	1000
India	73	23	4	1000
Indonesia	24	73	3	1000
Italy	50	40	10	1000
Kazakhstan	41	44	15	1000
Mexico	41	57	2	1000
Nigeria	75	14	1	1000
South Korea	42	55	3	1000
Spain	36	56	8	1000
Turkey	39	50	11	1000
United Kingdom	46	46	8	1000
USA	79	19	2	1000

Enviro-nics Global Issues Monitor Survey

**Table 12 Effectiveness of military force in dealing with international terrorism**

‘Do you agree that military force is the most effective way of dealing with international terrorism?’

5 October- 26 November 2001	Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	N
Argentina	34	57	9	1000
Canada	53	42	5	1000
Chili	51	41	8	1000
France	59	33	8	1000
Germany	39	59	2	1000
India	83	13	4	1000
Indonesia	54	44	2	1000
Italy	36	56	8	1000
Kazakhstan	54	31	15	1000
Mexico	43	49	8	1000
Nigeria	68	19	13	1000
South Korea	45	54	1	1000
Spain	44	43	13	1000
Turkey	55	42	3	1000
United Kingdom	46	46	8	1000
USA	76	21	3	1000

Enviro-nics Global Issues Monitor Survey

**Table 13 Has [your government] reacted well to the terrorist attacks?**

‘Would you say that [NATIONALITY] government has reacted to the present terrorist crisis very well, rather well, neither well nor badly (vol.), rather badly, very badly, have not reacted at all (vol.)?’

13-23 November 2001	Very well	Rather well	Neither well nor badly	Rather badly	Very badly	No opinion	N
Austria	6	36	31	14	3	10	1000
Belgium	11	61	11	10	3	4	959
Denmark	25	50	14	6	2	3	1000
Finland	12	63	10	10	2	3	1001
France	10	69	4	13	3	1	1007
Germany	14	56	5	18	5	2	1001
Greece	13	44	20	9	5	9	1000
Ireland	16	47	22	10	3	2	1000
Italy	12	56	9	17	5	1	1001
Luxembourg	15	48	19	5	1	12	1000
Netherlands	7	64	11	10	4	4	1002
Portugal	1	34	38	8	3	16	1002
Spain	6	49	18	14	6	7	1007
Sweden	14	61	8	10	3	4	1000
United Kingdom	44	43	1	8	4	-	1006
EU 15	16	55	9	13	4	3	--

EOS Gallup Europe/European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 114

**Table 14 Which aspect of the war most concerned about?**

'Which aspect of the war are you most concerned about?' (Read list of items, more than one answer possible Total >100%)

November-December 2001	Chemical or biological weapons	Nuclear weapons	Terrorist bomb attacks in public places	Hijacking and crashing of planes	Bombing of Afghan civilians	Afghan refugee problems	Don't know/ No response
Albania	63	48	45	38	24	21	5
Argentina	66	43	39	27	29	27	6
Austria	66	58	47	40	44	37	11
Azerbaijan	18	15	13	11	21	19	4
Belgium	65	58	67	69	61	64	8
Bolivia	73	54	48	19	22	9	2
Bosnia	76	72	58	47	59	47	11
Bulgaria	42	29	21	9	12	5	21
Cameroon	14	12	32	32	55	42	20
Colombia	61	30	28	20	16	13	6
Costa Rica	50	15	17	4	4	3	7
Croatia	70	58	55	36	30	27	5
Czech Rep.	63	46	48	27	24	23	4
Denmark	75	38	59	46	44	45	5
Dominican Rep.	33	18	21	18	4	3	3
Ecuador	40	20	17	8	8	5	2
Estonia	75	63	63	49	60	45	3
Finland	72	42	65	50	44	46	5
France	54	30	38	26	31	30	2
Georgia	38	12	25	4	29	1	30
Germany	32	9	26	8	8	14	7
Greece	79	61	43	37	42	34	3
Guatemala	33	21	23	9	9	2	3
Hong Kong	63	49	72	71	64	66	5
India	38	42	51	30	29	33	3
Ireland	55	48	51	48	42	39	9
Israel	71	57	76	52	45	24	4
Italy	74	62	68	62	49	39	9
Japan	64	41	44	37	39	49	15
Kenya	61	56	62	44	36	27	5
Korea	63	44	360	30	22	29	6
Kosovo	53	42	38	28	21	12	10
Kyrgyzstan	36	27	20	6	9	15	8
Latvia	69	48	50	41	42	43	6
Lithuania	70	55	48	38	34	18	4
Luxembourg	73	51	70	66	65	69	3
Macedonia	70	56	54	27	35	22	4
Malaysia	61	68	69	49	56	44	10
Mexico	62	30	32	17	20	25	5

REACTIONS TO THE 9/11 2001 TERRORIST ATTACK IN COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE US

Netherlands	51	31	70	66	65	69	3
Nigeria	26	27	31	24	30	21	24
Norway	53	28	48	28	37	29	7
Pakistan	37	37	24	19	51	23	1
Panama	55	20	13	5	3	2	2
Peru	75	46	44	22	19	11	2
Philippines	28	18	39	8	4	1	5
Poland	70	61	42	26	18	17	7
Portugal	74	44	41	35	33	43	4
Romania	78	69	60	45	36	29	9
Russia	29	15	24	2	6	5	19
Slovak Rep.	54	47	51	31	25	16	0
Spain	32	14	30	1	4	9	10
Sweden	53	40	39	36	22	2	1
Switzerland	76	58	59	62	44	50	5
Turkey	68	62	54	30	30	20	12
Ukraine	68	61	56	30	48	29	5
United Kingdom (ex NI)	60	49	58	46	46	49	6
Uruguay	75	59	43	20	37	10	2
Venezuela	39	24	18	8	4	4	3
Yugoslavia	49	48	30	12	13	3	9
Zimbabwe	23	23	31	17	19	9	38

Gallup International. N per country unknown

**Table 15 Possible victims (civilian and military) and support for military action in Afghanistan? (United Kingdom)**

- a) ‘What level of Afghan civilian casualties would make you change your mind on supporting military action by Britain?’  
 b) ‘What level of British military casualties would make you change your mind on supporting military action by Britain?’

	Any Afghan civilian casualties	Over 100 Afghan civilian casualties	Over 1000 Afghan civilian casualties	Over 5000 Afghan civilian casualties	Would not change mind because of casualties	Do not support any military action by Britain	Don't know	N
31 October-2 November 2001	6	4	6	5	50	18	10	4381
	Any British casualties	Over 100 British casualties	Over 1000 British casualties	Over 5000 British casualties	Would not change mind because of casualties	Do not support any military action by Britain	Don't know	N
19-21 September 2001	11	7	7	2	40	21	12	3128
31 October-2 November 2001	9	8	7	2	46	18	10	4381

YouGov poll/*The Observer*

**Table 16 How acceptable are civilian casualties in Afghanistan? (Netherlands)**

‘How acceptable is the degree to which the population in Afghanistan has been hit by the American attacks?’

	Totally acceptable	Rather acceptable	Rather unacceptable	Totally unacceptable	No opinion	N
end November 2001	7	39	32	18	4	1020



NIPO/SMK

**Table 17 Should Netherlands continue to take part in war when casualties are incurred? (Netherlands)**

‘Should the Netherlands continue to take part in operations against terrorism if this would cause casualties among our military forces?’

	Yes	No	No opinion	N
end November 2001	66	20	13	1020

idem conflict over Kosovo (1999)

1999	68	14	18	1020
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idem Ethiopia/Eritrea (2000)

2000	47	37	17	1020
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NIPO/SMK

**Table 18 Agreement with statements on the conflict with terrorism? (United Kingdom)**

‘Do you agree or disagree with the following statements...

‘If necessary, America and Britain should be willing to risk the lives of their own troops to track down Bin Laden and overthrow the Taliban regime’

	Strongly agree	Tend to agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to disagree	Disagree strongly	Don't know	N
10-11 October 2001	29	35	8	14	14	-	500

ICM /*Evening Standard*, poll among 500 adults in London


**Table 19 Does the war on terrorism justify taking risks with lives of French soldiers?**

‘Does the war on terrorism justify that France takes the risk that an important number of French military lose their lives?’

	Yes, completely	Yes, rather	No, rather not	Not at all	No answer	N
21-22 September 2001	19	27	27	24	3	929

Ipsos /BFM/Le Point

Figure 1 **The gap between Europe and the United States** (% agreement with US policies)



*Text of the questions:*

- 1) 'Do you approve or disapprove of the U.S. led military campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan?'
- 2) 'Do you approve or disapprove of President Bush calling Iraq, Iran and North Korea an Axis of Evil?'
- 3) 'Do you approve or disapprove of the US decision to try Al Qaeda prisoners before military tribunals rather than in the US civilian courts?'
- 4) 'Do you think the US is doing as much as it can to bring about a peace settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, or don't you think so?'
- 5) 'Would you favor or oppose the US and its allies taking military action in Iraq to end Saddam Hussein's rule as part of the war on terrorism?'

6) 'How do you see the US led war on terrorism: do you think the US is taking into account the interests of its allies in the fight against terrorism or do you think the US is acting mainly on its own interests?'

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## **Annex 1**

### **List of polls (September-December 2001) covered for this survey (situation as of 1 May 2002)**

#### *International*

EOS Gallup Europe/European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 114, 13-23 November 2001  
Environics Global Issues Monitor Survey, October-November 2001  
Gallup International poll, 14-17 September 2001  
Gallup International poll, November-December 2001  
Gallup poll of Islamic world, December 2001-January 2002  
Harris Interactive/*Aasahi Shimbun*, November 2001  
IPSOS-Reid, 12 November-16 December 2001  
IPSOS-Reid, Global Monitor, January 2002  
PEW International poll, April 2002  
Roy Morgan International, 12 September 2001  
Sofres/*Liberation/RTL*, 27 November-22 December 2001

#### *Austria*

SWS/ Oesterreichische Gesellschaft fuer Europapolitik, 8-17 October 2001

#### *Canada*

Compas, 26-27 September 2001  
Compas, 10 February-12 March 2002  
Decima, 18-22 September 2001  
EKOS, 24-26 September 2001  
Ipsos-Reid/CTV/*Globe and Mail*, 17-20 September 2001  
Ipsos-Reid/CTV/*Globe and Mail*, 16-18 October, 2001  
Ipsos-Reid/CTV/*Globe and Mail*, 13-15 November 2001  
Ipsos-Reid/CTV/*Globe and Mail*, 27-29 November, 2001  
Ipsos-Reid/CTV/*Globe and Mail*, 18-20 December, 2001  
Ipsos-Reid/CTV/*Globe and Mail*, 29-30 January 2002  
Ipsos-Reid/CTV/*Globe and Mail*, 19-21 February, 2002  
Leger Marketing, 24-26 April 2002

*France*

BVA/CCFD/barometre L'expansion-LCI, 28-29 September 2001  
CSA/*Le Parisien/Aujourd'Hui en France*, 12 September 2001  
CSA /VSD, 14-15 September 2001  
CSA/*l'Humanité*, 12-13 October 2001  
CSA/*La Croix*, 30 October 2001  
CSA /L'Institut du Droit, de la Paix et du Developpement, 29-30 October 2001  
CSA /*Le Parisien/Aujourd'hui en France*, 29-30 October 2001  
CSA/*La Croix*, 14-15 November 2001  
Ifop/*Le Journal du Dimanche*, 13-14 September 2001  
Ifop/*Dimanche Ouest France*, 20-21 September 2001  
Ifop/*Le Monde /Le Point /Europe 1*, 22-25 September 2001  
Ifop/*Le Monde /Le Point /Europe 1*, 27-29 September 2001  
Ifop/*Le Journal du Dimanche*, 27-28 September 2001  
Ifop/*Dimanche Ouest France*, 4-5 October 2001  
Ifop/*Le Figaro*, 11-12 October 2001  
Ipsos /BFM /*Le Journal Du Dimanche*, 14-15 September 2001  
Ipsos/*Journal du Dimanche/BFM*, 21-22 September  
Ipsos /BFM/*Le Point /*, 21-22 September 2001  
Ipsos/BFM/*Le Journal du Dimanche*, 5-6 October 2001  
Ipsos /BFM /*Le Journal Du Dimanche*, 12-13 October 2001  
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SOFRES/group of provincial newspapers, 26-27 September 2001  
SOFRES, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 2-3 November 2001

*Germany*

Allensbach, 13 September 2001  
Emnid/n-TV, mid-September 2001  
Emnid/n-TV, 24 - 30 September 2001  
Emnid/n-TV, 12 October 2001  
Emnid/n-TV, 19 October 2001  
Emnid/n-TV, 22-29 October 2001  
Emnid, 2 November 2001  
Emnid/ Ministry of Defense, 12-15 November 2001  
Emnid/ N-TV, 16 November 2001  
Emnid/n-TV, 7 January 2002  
Forsa/*Bildwoche*, September 2001  
Forsa/RTL/*Bild am Sonntag*, September 2001  
Forsa/N 24 TV, September 2001  
Forsa/*Eltern*, Mid-September 2001  
Forsa/radio N24, ? 2001  
Forsa/*Bildwoche*, 21 September 2001

Forsa/*Die Woche*, 5-9 October 2001  
Forsa/*Die Woche*, End of October 2001  
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen/ ZDF, 12-14 November 2001  
Infratest dimap/NDR, half September 2001  
Infratest dimap/NDR, 27 September-2 October 2001  
Infratest dimap, Deutschland trend/ARD, 25-30 October 2001  
Infratest dimap, Deutschland trend, 29 November- 4 December 2001  
Infratest dimap, Deutschland trend/ARD, 21-26 February 2002  
Infratest dimap/ *Welt am Sonntag*, December 2001  
*Der Spiegel*, mid-September 2001  
ZDF Politbarometer, October 2001

*Greece*

V-PRC, end of September 2001

*Hungary*

Gallup Organization, 12 September 2001

*Ireland*

ICM Research, 27 September 2001  
ICM Research, 11-12 October 2001

*Italy*

SWG/*Familia Christiana*, date?

*Japan*

Asahi Shimbun, 1 October 2001

*Morocco*

Telemark System/*L'Economiste*, 21-25 September 2001  
CSA TMO Maroc /*Al Ahdaf Al Maghribia*, 13-15 October 2001

*Netherlands*

CentERdata/Radio 1 Journaal, 14 September 2001  
Legendijk/CICAM, Nymegen University/VARA-TV, 24 October 2001  
NIPO/De Volkskrant, 26 September 2001  
NIPO/SMK, 26-28 November 2001

*Norway*

MMI/Dagbladet, mid-October 2001

*Pakistan*

Gallup Pakistan/Newsweek, 11-12 October 2001

*Palestine*

Development Studies Programme, Birzeit University, 4-6 October 4-6, 2001

*Russia*

Public Opinion Foundation, Early November 2001  
ROMIR (Russian Public Opinion & Market Research), 12 September 2001  
RosBusinessConsulting, 8-9 October 2001  
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*Scotland*

ICM Research/Scotsman, 17 September 2001  
Scottish Sunday Mail, 21 October 2001

*Switzerland*

Le Matin, 23 September 2001

*United Kingdom*

ICM Research/The Guardian, 14-16 September 2001  
ICM Research, 21-23 September 2001  
ICM Research/Panorama, 28-29 September 2001  
ICM Research/Evening Standard, 10-11 October 2001  
ICM Research/The Guardian, 10-11 October 2001  
ICM Research, 17-18 October 2001  
ICM Research/The Guardian, 26-28 October 2001  
ICM Research/The Guardian, 16-18 November 2001  
ICM Research, 23-24 January 2002  
ICM Research/The Guardian, 15-17 March 2002  
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MORI/ITV1, 9 October 2001  
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MORI/*Mail on Sunday*, 1-2 November 2001  
MORI, Political Attitudes in Great Britain/*The Times*, 27-29 November 2001  
MORI/ Political Attitudes in Great Britain/*The Times*, 24-28 January 2002  
MORI/*Time Magazine*, 15-17 March 2002  
YouGov poll/*The Observer*, 19-21 September 23, 2001  
YouGov poll/*The Observer*, 7 October 2001  
YouGov poll/*The Observer*, 31 October –2 November 2001